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ABSTRACT 
  Children have a constitutional right to bodily integrity. Courts do 
not hesitate to vindicate that right when children are abused by state 
actors. Moreover, in at least some cases, a child’s right to bodily 
integrity applies within the family, giving the child the right to avoid 
unwanted physical intrusions regardless of the parents’ wishes. 
Nonetheless, the scope of this right vis-à-vis the parents is unclear; the 
extent to which it applies beyond the narrow context of abortion and 
contraception has been almost entirely unexplored and untheorized. 
This Article is the first in the legal literature to analyze the 
constitutional right of minors to bodily integrity within the family by 
spanning traditionally disparate doctrinal categories such as abortion 
rights; corporal punishment; medical decisionmaking; and 
nontherapeutic physical interventions such as tattooing, piercing, and 
circumcision. However, the constitutional right of minors to bodily 
integrity raises complex philosophical questions concerning the 
proper relationship between family and state, as well as difficult 
doctrinal and theoretical issues concerning the ever-murky idea of 
state action. This Article canvasses those issues with the ultimate goal 
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The natural parent needs no process to temporarily deprive his child 
of its liberty by confining it in his own home . . . ; nor is the state, 
when compelled, as parens patriae, to take the place of the father for 
the same purpose, required to adopt any process as a means of 
placing its hands upon the child . . . . 
– Commonwealth v. Fisher, 19051 
INTRODUCTION 
When Anna Fitzgerald, the thirteen-year-old heroine of the 
popular novel My Sister’s Keeper, appears in an attorney’s office and 
says she wants to sue her parents “for the rights to her own body,” the 
attorney tries to give her the phone number for Planned Parenthood.2 
Anna is not seeking access to contraception or abortion, however—
she is hoping to avoid being forced by her mother to donate a kidney 
to Anna’s sister, who is dying of leukemia.3 
The scene between Anna and her attorney highlights two 
peculiar features of minors’ constitutional rights to bodily integrity. 
First, those rights are largely understood, and most fully developed, in 
the context of minors’ sexual and reproductive rights. Indeed, it may 
seem odd even to speak of minors’ bodily integrity rights in any other 
context. When the law regulates children’s bodies in other contexts, it 
largely frames the issues in terms of family privacy, parental rights, or 
perhaps children’s vaguely defined best interests.4 
Second, minors do possess a constitutional right to bodily 
security and autonomy—in at least some contexts even against their 
parents. The most widely recognized context for this constitutional 
right is that of reproductive healthcare: some minors possess a right to 
seek abortion and possibly contraception without involving their 
parents.5 But, as this Article explains below, it is not clear precisely 
 
 1. Commonwealth v. Fisher, 62 A. 198, 200, 201 (Pa. 1905) (holding constitutional 
Pennsylvania’s act permitting delinquent and neglected children to be committed to a “[h]ouse 
of [r]efuge”). The last words of the quoted sentence are “to lead it into one of its courts.” Id. 
 2. JODI PICOULT, MY SISTER’S KEEPER 20–23 (2004). 
 3. Id. 
 4. See, e.g., Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386, 390, 391 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972) (discussing 
sibling organ donation in relation to parents’ rights and minor’s rights, without specifying which 
rights of the minor were involved); Oliner v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 431 N.Y.S.2d 271, 272 (Sup. Ct. 
1980) (considering parent’s legal “entitle[ment] to have a ‘bris’ [circumcision] performed for his 
infant son”). 
 5. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647 (1979) (plurality opinion); Planned Parenthood of 
Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976). 
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how or why the constitutional bodily integrity right can be limited to 
this particular context. Indeed, courts routinely recognize a 
constitutional bodily integrity right of children not to be abused by 
state actors.6 This aspect of the bodily integrity right is not limited to 
sexual and reproductive health-care services, but instead extends to 
protect minors against all severe and unwanted state-imposed 
physical intrusions. 
Spanning traditional doctrinal categories, this Article aims to 
examine and, ultimately, to provide structure for the amorphous 
constitutional right of minors to bodily integrity. It is the first Article 
in the legal literature to consider the landscape of regulation across 
such diverse areas as corporal punishment, parents’ authority to grant 
or withhold consent for children’s medical care, minors’ access to 
abortion, and parental control over nonmedical interventions such as 
tattooing and ear piercing, with the aim of identifying a constitutional 
right that applies throughout.7 This Article also attempts to provide 
some theoretical explanations for the law’s treatment of the subject of 
children’s rights to bodily integrity independent of their parents. In 
particular, it grapples with the inherent theoretical difficulties 
attendant upon recognizing a meaningful constitutional right of 
children to bodily integrity, including the problem of identifying state 
 
 6. See cases cited infra notes 18, 26–28. 
 7. Some scholarship from the 1970s onward addressed the nascent constitutional rights of 
children, which found recognition beginning in the 1960s. For example, Professors Lee 
Teitelbaum and James Ellis considered the due-process rights of children, but their work was 
written before much of the doctrinal development discussed in this Article, and it focuses on the 
due-process right to liberty generally, rather than vis-à-vis the parents. Lee E. Teitelbaum & 
James W. Ellis, The Liberty Interest of Children: Due Process Rights and Their Application, 12 
FAM. L.Q. 153, 170–74 (1978). Other articles have discussed the constitutional bodily integrity 
rights of children in specific, limited contexts, such as growth attenuation, genital-normalization 
surgery, or sibling organ donation. See generally Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Testing the 
Boundaries of Family Privacy: The Special Case of Pediatric Sibling Transplants, 35 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1289, 1328 (2014); Rhonda Gay Hartman, Noblesse Oblige: States’ Obligations to 
Minors Living with Life-Limiting Conditions, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 333 (2012); Ross Povenmire, Do 
Parents Have the Legal Authority to Consent to the Surgical Amputation of Normal, Healthy 
Tissue from Their Infant Children? The Practice of Circumcision in the United States, 7 AM. U. J. 
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 87 (1999); Mary Koll, Note, Growth, Interrupted: Nontherapeutic 
Growth Attenuation, Parental Medical Decision Making, and the Profoundly Developmentally 
Disabled Child’s Right to Bodily Integrity, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 225; Anne Tamar-Mattis, Note, 
Exceptions to the Rule: Curing the Law’s Failure to Protect Intersex Infants, 21 BERKELEY J. 
GENDER L. & JUST. 59 (2006). In addition, Professor Caitlin Borgmann has described and 
critiqued the constitutional right against compelled bodily intrusions across multiple contexts, 
including corporal punishment, but her analysis focuses primarily on adults, and only on the 
right of individuals against the state. See generally Caitlin Borgmann, The Constitutionality of 
Government-Imposed Bodily Intrusions, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1059. 
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action in the context of what often appears to be private 
decisionmaking. Drawing on the theoretical work of the historian and 
philosopher Michel Foucault, this Article argues that the 
pervasiveness of state power, which operates even within the 
otherwise-private family, deserves recognition in state-action 
doctrine. This Article thus advocates for a more robust concept of 
children’s bodily integrity that would be enforceable, at least in some 
contexts, through a constitutional cause of action. 
But why focus on the right to bodily integrity rather than any of 
the countless other aspects of the parent-child relationship that the 
law affects? Of course, children’s rights are affected by parental and 
state control in numerous dimensions—not just with respect to their 
bodies. To a large extent, moreover, the parent-child relationship, 
and the role of the state within that relationship, is well-trodden 
ground, covered extensively by political theorists, philosophers, and 
legal scholars, among others.8 In part, this Article simply uses the 
concept of bodily integrity as a new lens to examine that relationship, 
thereby yielding some novel insights. At the same time, however, 
there is much that is unique, and uniquely interesting, about the issue 
of minors’ constitutional right to bodily integrity. 
First, the problem of minors’ right to bodily integrity is one of 
overlapping and potentially conflicting constitutional privacy rights: 
that of the family as an entity, and that of the child as an autonomous 
citizen who is entitled to the protection of the state.9 This facet of the 
problem distinguishes it from many other aspects of the parent-child-
state relationship, in which there is often no colorable right on the 
part of the child to compete with parental rights and state interests.10 
 
 8. See infra Part II. 
 9. Cf. Teitelbaum & Ellis, supra note 7, at 170–74 (noting that parental-rights cases such 
as Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); and 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) involved no conflict between parent and child, and that 
cases involving parent-child conflict present the problem of children’s liberty interests more 
directly). 
 10. For example, when parents make decisions about their children’s education, the 
children’s constitutional rights are not usually involved. Some laws may impact children’s rights 
to free speech or the free exercise of religion, see, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 
(1944) (implicating both), but it is not clear to what extent children possess such rights 
independently of their parents. Certainly, children’s free-speech rights are more limited than 
adults’ when they are acting independently in the school context or in the marketplace, see, e.g., 
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 404 (2007); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636–37 
(1968); but see Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2742 (2011) (holding that minors 
have a right to access violent video games even if their parents do not approve), but few, if any, 
cases clearly address minors’ First Amendment right to resist parental mandates. Similarly, 
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Indeed, though the minors’ right to bodily integrity is often, albeit 
obliquely, referenced by courts and commentators alike,11 it exists 
uncomfortably at the intersection of two unreconciled and potentially 
irreconcilable lines of doctrine: the line that recognizes minors’ 
constitutional privacy rights, exemplified by Planned Parenthood v. 
Danforth12 and Bellotti v. Baird,13 and the line that recognizes parents’ 
right to make important decisions for their children, exemplified by 
Meyer v. Nebraska14 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters.15 
Moreover, identifying children’s right to bodily integrity raises 
particularly difficult but relatively unexamined questions about when 
state intervention in the family is justified. It is often taken for 
granted—by courts, by liberal philosophers, and by more conservative 
or parentalist thinkers—that the state’s power to intervene in the 
family at least exists to prevent abuse, neglect, or similar harm to the 
child.16 Yet, this apparently agreed-upon limit begs a deeper question 
regarding the meaning of “abuse” and the state’s authority to define 
and delimit that term. This Article problematizes some previously 
unquestioned assumptions about the propriety of state intervention in 
parental control over children’s bodies. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the existing 
right of minors to bodily integrity. Drawing on the example of 
abortion, it queries whether the right of minors to bodily security and 
autonomy, even in the face of parental disagreement, can be extended 
beyond that seemingly sui generis context, and if so, what the scope of 
such a right might be. Proceeding from this background, Part II 
discusses the two predominant philosophical views of the family and 
its relationship to the state, both of which uncomfortably coexist in 
constitutional case law pertaining to children’s and parents’ rights. 
Part III then demonstrates how conflicting views of the family create 
two significant difficulties in identifying and enforcing children’s right 
 
children have a right to equal protection of the laws, which may be involved when the state 
permits or obstructs certain parental choices, but those rights again are generally treated as 
derivative, rather than independent, of the parents’ rights. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 
U.S. 483, 487 (1954). 
 11. Povenmire, supra note 7, at 100, 104–07; Jonathan Todres, Maturity, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 
1107, 1139–42 (2012); Koll, supra note 7, at 235–42; Tamar-Mattis, supra note 7, at 88, 99–100.  
 12. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
 13. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). 
 14. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 15. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 16. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168–70 (1944); infra Part II. 
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to bodily integrity within the family. First is the doctrinal problem of 
identifying state action in the context of minors’ rights. Often, 
conflicts around minors’ right to bodily integrity involve no apparent 
state actor, but state-mandated and state-enforced duties, immunities, 
and privileges permeate the parent-child relationship. The second 
difficulty is a conceptual one. The more expansive the judicial 
understanding of children’s right to bodily integrity, the more the 
state is invited to intervene into both minors’ and parents’ 
decisionmaking. These two problems, which appear to be 
conceptually and doctrinally distinct, are in fact closely related to one 
another. Both are consequences of the diffuse nature of state power, 
which, according to Foucault, permeates even the most seemingly 
intimate relationships and simultaneously “governmentalizes” those 
private spheres.17  
Finally, Part IV envisions a meaningful, but meaningfully 
delimited, right to bodily integrity for children within the family. It 
argues that a broadened understanding of state action in the parent-
child decisionmaking context may provide a partial way forward 
toward vindicating a real but not overly expansive constitutional right 
of children to bodily integrity. In particular, a constitutional bodily 
integrity right should be recognized and applied whenever a minor 
validly invokes the jurisdiction of a court on her behalf. This means 
that minors should be able to vindicate bodily integrity rights against 
state actors in suits that are otherwise properly brought under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983. This also means that minors are entitled to have courts, 
as state actors, take their constitutional rights into account when 
adjudicating disputes between private parties such as parents and 
hospitals. In terms of substantive standards, although parents should 
continue to be afforded discretion in decisionmaking for immature 
minors, courts should enforce younger minors’ right to protection of 
their best interests and older, mature minors’ right to autonomy in 
decisionmaking. 
I.  THE EXISTING RIGHT TO BODILY INTEGRITY 
Children possess a constitutional right to bodily integrity, defined 
as a right against harmful or unwanted physical intrusions mandated 
or caused by government action, together with a right to seek desired 
 
 17. As explained infra Part III.B, these terms and the theory behind them are imported 
from the work of the French historian and philosopher Michel Foucault. 
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medical treatments or interventions.18 Moreover, this right applies 
even against the minor’s parents in some cases. This Part endeavors 
to unpack this right, first by demonstrating its applicability when state 
actors are involved, and second by considering when and how the 
right is understood to apply to ostensibly private disputes. Minors’ 
constitutional right to bodily integrity may be at issue in disputes 
between private parties when a minor attempts to engage in a 
constitutionally protected activity that the minor’s parents disapprove 
of, or when the minor seeks immunity from harm imposed by his 
parents. This Part also considers the limits of this right, which has 
been only partially constitutionalized. 
A. The Right to Bodily Integrity Against the State 
The proposition that children have rights against unwanted 
bodily intrusions imposed upon them by the state is relatively 
uncontroversial. In Ingraham v. Wright,19 the Supreme Court 
acknowledged minors’ liberty interest in “personal security.”20 
Ingraham dealt with allegations that corporal punishments 
administered by school officials pursuant to Florida law were so 
severe and painful—including causing a hematoma in one student and 
“depriving [another student] of the full use of his arm for a week”—
that they violated the students’ right to due process.21 The Ingraham 
Court held that the minors had a procedural due-process right, but it 
also held that the only process due was the availability of a 
postdeprivation remedy.22 Moreover, the Court acknowledged that 
the right was limited by the scope of the traditional common-law 
acceptance of corporal punishment and the school’s interest in 
discipline.23 Nonetheless, in the process of analyzing the due-process 
 
 18. See, e.g., Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1063 (6th Cir. 1998). The term 
“bodily integrity” may not seem like a good fit for some of the situations discussed below, such 
as when minors seek interventions like cosmetic surgery or tattooing, which the parents resist. 
Those situations seem to invoke a form of bodily control but not necessarily “integrity,” or 
wholeness, per se. “Bodily integrity” is nonetheless used throughout this Article because it is the 
term that is used in constitutional doctrine, which broadly encompasses a right to autonomy 
with respect to bodily interventions. Cf. Borgmann, supra note 7, at 1063 (identifying the right 
to bodily integrity as including both a “right to repel bodily intrusions” and a “right to 
affirmative decision making about one’s body”). 
 19. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977). 
 20. Id. at 652. 
 21. Id. at 657. 
 22. Id. at 683. 
 23. Id. at 676. 
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claims, the Court also recognized that the right to freedom from 
unreasonable bodily restraint and punishment was a fundamental 
liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.24 This right 
may therefore provide the basis for a substantive due-process claim, 
as well as a procedural due-process claim, if either is infringed 
without sufficient justification.25 
Drawing on Ingraham, numerous cases have recognized that 
children’s bodily integrity right is violated when children are 
mistreated by a state actor—usually in the context of a school or 
juvenile-detention center. For example, some cases vindicate minors’ 
rights against excessive corporal punishment by school officials.26 
Those cases rely on the Supreme Court’s holding that students have a 
“constitutionally protected liberty interest” in avoiding arbitrary or 
excessive corporal punishment.27 Similarly, the bodily integrity right is 
invoked to support the claim that children have a constitutional 
substantive due-process right not to be physically or sexually abused 
by a state actor.28 Thus, the bodily integrity right has been asserted 
extensively in the school and juvenile-detention contexts. 
 
 24. Id. at 673–74 (noting that this right is one of the “privileges long recognized at common 
law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men” (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (quotation marks omitted))). The Supreme Court subsequently 
described Ingraham as establishing that “arbitrary corporal punishment represents an invasion 
of personal security to which . . . parents do not consent when entrusting the educational 
mission to the State.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995). 
 25. See Borgmann, supra note 7, at 1104 (noting that lower courts have read Ingraham to 
imply the existence of a substantive due-process right against corporal punishment by state 
actors in some circumstances). 
 26. E.g., P.B. v. Koch, 96 F.3d 1298, 1304 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that children have a 
constitutional right against excessive physical punishment and assault by a public-school 
teacher); Webb v. McCullough, 828 F.2d 1151, 1158 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that a principal’s 
physical assault on a student implicated the student’s substantive due-process rights); Jefferson 
v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F.2d 303, 305 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that a teacher who tied a 
second grader to a chair for almost two days at school was not entitled to qualified immunity for 
violating the child’s right to bodily integrity). 
 27. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 674. 
 28. See, e.g., Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 171 F.3d 607, 611 (8th Cir. 1999) (observing 
that “[a] number of circuit courts have found due process violations when state actors have 
inflicted sexual abuse on individuals” (alteration in original) (quoting Rogers v. City of Little 
Rock, 152 F.3d 790, 795 (8th Cir. 1998)) (quotation marks omitted)); Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. #40, 
130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Ingraham for the proposition that students have a 
constitutionally protected right to bodily integrity, and holding that the right was violated when 
a public-school janitor sexually abused a child); Doe v. Rains Cnty. Indep. Sch. Dist., 66 F.3d 
1402, 1407 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating that, although it “is fairly debatable as an original 
proposition,” precedent clearly establishes that sexual abuse of a minor by a state actor 
constitutes a violation of the minor’s right to constitutional bodily integrity). 
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On occasion, courts have upheld minors’ bodily integrity claims 
outside the institutional context. For example, in In re L.,29 a trial 
court asserted that a sixteen-year-old minor had a right to “free[dom] 
from unwanted infringements of bodily integrity” that weighed 
against her putative father’s request that she undergo a blood test.30 
Because the father had sought a court order requiring the test to 
establish his legal paternity, the court took into account the minor’s 
right to bodily integrity against the state.31 Relatedly, in the case of In 
re E.G.,32 a state supreme court alluded to the possibility that minors 
have bodily integrity rights with respect to end-of-life care.33 In that 
case, the court considered whether a mature seventeen-year-old 
minor had the right to refuse lifesaving blood transfusions for 
leukemia.34 Although the minor’s mother agreed with her decision, 
the state filed a petition to have the minor declared medically 
neglected so that the treatment could be compelled.35 The court 
ultimately upheld the minor’s decision on the ground that she was 
“mature” and therefore permitted to refuse treatment under state 
common law.36 However, the court also suggested, without deciding, 
that the minor might have a constitutional privacy right to refuse 
treatment.37 Thus, though the scope of the right is unclear, there is 
little doubt that minors do possess a constitutional right to bodily 
security and protection against unwanted bodily intrusions that are 
imposed or mandated by state actors. 
B. The Right to Bodily Integrity Against the Parents and the State 
Courts have partially but inconsistently recognized children’s 
right to bodily integrity. In the reproductive-health context, children 
appear to have the most expansive power, grounded in the 
Constitution, to make decisions about their bodies. Outside that 
 
 29. In re L., 632 A.2d 59 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1993). 
 30. Id. at 61. 
 31. Id. 
 32. In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. 1989). 
 33. Id. at 326. 
 34. Id. at 324. 
 35. Id. at 323. 
 36. Id. at 326. 
 37. Id. The mature minor’s right to refuse potentially lifesaving medical treatment is also 
raised by the novel My Sister’s Keeper. Spoiler alert: It turns out that the protagonist, Anna, is 
attempting to refuse the kidney donation to respect her terminally ill sister’s desire to die 
without further invasive treatment. PICOULT, supra note 2, at 448. 
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context, however, a patchwork of state statutory and common law 
governs. As detailed below, parents are generally presumed by state 
law to be empowered to consent to bodily interventions on behalf of 
their children. Rarely has it been suggested that children’s 
constitutional right to bodily integrity is implicated when state law 
delegates decisionmaking authority over children’s bodies to the 
parents. 
1. Abortion and Contraception.  Minors’ right to bodily integrity 
is uniquely salient in one area of constitutional jurisprudence—
reproductive rights. In that area, the right may be understood as a 
constitutional right not just against the state, but also against the 
minor’s own parents. The permissible extent and manner of a state’s 
regulation of minors’ reproductive health-care decisions has been the 
subject of relatively in-depth consideration by the Supreme Court, 
and the federal courts have promulgated a well-developed body of 
doctrine describing minors’ rights to access contraception and 
abortion, regardless of their parents’ wishes. In theory at least, this 
area represents the most expansive legal recognition for minors’ 
constitutional liberty rights against their parents. It is not clear, 
however, whether this right extends beyond the abortion context. 
Although courts appear only to accept a bodily integrity right for 
minors within the family in that narrow set of cases, there is no clear 
rationale for limiting the right in this way. 
A constitutional right to bodily integrity for minors was first 
recognized in the abortion context in the 1970s.38 Soon after Roe v. 
Wade39 was decided, states began passing laws requiring parental 
consent for minors seeking abortions.40 The Supreme Court, however, 
did not lose much time in striking these laws down.41 In Danforth, the 
Court held that “the State does not have the constitutional authority 
to give a third party,” including the minor’s parent, “an absolute, and 
possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his 
 
 38. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 53 (1976). 
 39. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 40. See, e.g., Eve W. Paul, Harriet F. Pilpel & Nancy F. Wechsler, Pregnancy, Teenagers 
and the Law, 1976, 8 FAM. PLANNING PERSP. 16, 19 (1976) (noting that thirteen parental-
consent requirements for abortion had been passed as of 1974, and that seven more were passed 
between 1974 and 1976). 
 41. See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 440–41 (1983), 
overruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Danforth, 428 U.S. at 
74; Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, 428 U.S. 901, 901 (1976) (mem.); Gerstein v. Coe, 428 U.S. 901, 901 
(1976) (mem.). 
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patient to terminate the patient’s pregnancy, regardless of the reason 
for withholding the consent.”42 At the same time, the Court 
emphasized that its opinion was not intended to imply an absolute 
right, possessed by all minors in all circumstances, to consent on their 
own to the procedure.43 Instead, the Court appeared to welcome a 
more refined legal structure for parental involvement in minors’ 
abortion decisions.44 
The Court had the opportunity to consider a more nuanced 
legislative scheme in adjudicating the constitutionality of 
Massachusetts’ parental-consent law.45 The Court outlined the 
requirements for a constitutional parental-consent law for abortion in 
Bellotti v. Baird.46 The governing rule since Bellotti essentially has 
been that states may not require parental consent for minors seeking 
abortions unless they also provide a mechanism called a “judicial 
bypass,” by which the minor can seek judicial permission to obtain an 
abortion on her own upon a showing either that she is mature and 
well-informed enough to consent to the procedure, or that the 
abortion would be in her best interests.47 Whether parents disagree 
with the minor’s decision or not, she thus appears to have a 
constitutional right to seek an abortion without their approval. 
Although Bellotti’s rule applies only against the state in the sense that 
it constrains the scope of parental-involvement laws, the right to 
choose an abortion, in a sense, also takes the form of a right against 
both the state and the parents. That is to say, it limits the 
circumstances, the extent, and the reasons for which the minor may 
be prevented from having an abortion by either her parents or the 
state.48 
 
 42. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74. 
 43. Id. at 75 (“We emphasize that our holding . . . does not suggest that every minor, 
regardless of age or maturity, may give effective consent for termination of her pregnancy.”). 
 44. Id. 
 45. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 625–26 (1979) (plurality opinion); Bellotti v. Baird, 
428 U.S. 132, 135–36 (1976). 
 46. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643–44. 
 47. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 427 (1990). Although Bellotti was a plurality 
opinion, it has been treated by the Supreme Court and lower courts as delineating the relevant 
constitutional rule. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992) 
(citing Bellotti, 443 U.S. 622). 
 48. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 627. In addition, the district court had considered whether the 
parents had “independent rights” in the minor’s abortion decision that had to be protected by 
the court. Baird v. Bellotti, 393 F. Supp. 847, 856 (D. Mass. 1975), vacated, 428 U.S. at 134. On 
appeal, the Supreme Court noted this argument but declined to analyze it, speaking primarily of 
the parents’ “role” rather than of their rights. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 627, 637–39. 
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The Supreme Court has also recognized minors’ right to make 
decisions affecting their own bodies with respect to access to 
contraception. In Carey v. Population Services International,49 decided 
after Danforth and during the Bellotti litigation, the Supreme Court 
struck down by a 7–2 vote a state law prohibiting, among other things, 
the distribution of contraceptives to anyone under the age of sixteen.50 
The right recognized in Carey is strikingly nebulous, however. 
Although a four-Justice plurality in Carey rested its decision on a 
robust understanding of minors’ constitutional privacy rights as 
virtually equivalent to adults’, the concurring opinions, which 
provided the votes the majority needed to strike down the 
prohibition, were considerably more circumspect. Justice Brennan’s 
plurality opinion, joined by Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Blackmun, 
declared that the state may not, consistent with the Constitution, 
“burden the right [of minors] to decide whether to bear children” 
without a medical basis for the regulation, nor “delegate[] the State’s 
authority to disapprove of minors’ sexual behavior to physicians, who 
may exercise it arbitrarily.”51 Justices White and Stevens both 
concurred in the result primarily on the ground that there was a poor 
means–end fit between the state’s goal of deterring sexual activity and 
its ban on contraceptives for minors.52 At the same time, both 
emphasized that no right of minors to engage in sexual activity could 
be derived from the Court’s holding.53 Justice Powell, who also 
concurred, was merely concerned about the infringement on the 
rights of married minors under the age of sixteen and on the rights of 
parents who wished to provide contraceptives to their children.54 
As this analysis of Carey suggests, a majority of the Court has not 
clearly held that minors have a right to access contraception when 
their parents disapprove. Indeed, that issue was not raised by the New 
York law at issue in Carey, which forbade those under sixteen from 
accessing contraception with or without parental consent.55 
 
 49. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
 50. Id. at 694. 
 51. Id. at 697–99. 
 52. Id. at 702–03 (White, J., concurring); id. at 714–16 (Stevens, J., concurring) (using the 
amusingly apt metaphor that “[i]t is as though a State decided to dramatize its disapproval of 
motorcycles by forbidding the use of safety helmets”). 
 53. Id. at 702 (White, J., concurring); id. at 713 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 54. Id. at 707–10 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 55. Id. at 681. Nonetheless, twenty-one states explicitly permit all minors to consent on 
their own to contraceptive services. GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: MINORS’ 
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Nonetheless, both courts and commentators have inferred such a 
right, which may seem to be a logical corollary of the abortion right.56 
2. Beyond Minors’ Reproductive Rights?  In most other areas 
where minors’ bodily integrity right may be implicated, regulation 
occurs through several common-law and statutory doctrines that 
rarely refer to one another or to the constitutional privacy right. As in 
the case of abortion and contraception, parents may—with the 
support of state law—authorize or withhold authority for various 
medical and nonmedical interventions for their minor children.57 
Corporal punishment, medical-treatment decisions, and 
nontherapeutic interventions like tattooing and piercing are generally 
regulated by state law, which presumes parents have broad 
decisionmaking authority in most cases.58 Strikingly, constitutional 
claims are rarely raised or addressed in cases challenging the 
appropriateness of these bodily intrusions. Rather, common-law 
standards govern, and little or no mention is made of substantive due 
process or the right to bodily integrity. 
 
ACCESS TO CONTRACEPTIVE SERVICES (2014), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/
statecenter/spibs/spib_MACS.pdf. In some states, minors are allowed to access contraceptives 
for health reasons, and in several others, only married minors can access contraception without 
parental consent. Id. The states allowing minors to access contraception for health reasons are 
Florida, Illinois, and Maine. FLA. STAT. § 381.0051 (2012); 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/1 § 1 (2012); 
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 1908 (2004). Those states also allow minors who are married or are 
themselves parents to consent on their own to contraception. Id. A few states have no explicit 
law on the topic. GUTTMACHER INST., supra. 
 56. See, e.g., Arneth v. Gross, 699 F. Supp. 450, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Planned Parenthood 
Ass’n of Utah v. Matheson, 582 F. Supp. 1001, 1007–09 (D. Utah 1983); Brenda D. Hofman, 
Note, The Squeal Rule: Statutory Resolution and Constitutional Implications—Burdening the 
Minor’s Right of Privacy, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1325, 1341–42. 
 57. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-3 (2013). Several statutes delegate authority to 
parents by negative implication, stating simply that minors are incompetent to provide consent 
for their own care in most circumstances. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 20-102 
(LexisNexis 2009 & Supp. 2014); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10101 (West 2012) (specifying that 
an individual must be over eighteen to give consent to medical treatment). 
 58. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3721 (2010); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31 (2012 & 
Supp. 2013). Other than tattooing and piercing, most elective, nontherapeutic interventions are 
not specifically mentioned in state statutory law. The widespread assumption of most 
commentators has been that parents have wide discretion to consent or withhold consent to 
such interventions, as with similar medical interventions. See, e.g., JULIE A. GREENBERG, 
INTERSEXUALITY AND THE LAW: WHY SEX MATTERS 32 (2012); Susan Gilbert, Children’s 
Bodies, Parents’ Choices, 39 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 14, 14 (2009); Alicia Ouellette, Body 
Modification and Adolescent Decision Making: Proceed with Caution, 15 J. HEALTH CARE L. & 
POL’Y 129, 136 (2012). 
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For example, all fifty states have statutes purporting to 
distinguish permissible corporal punishment from abuse. Nearly all of 
those statutes use amorphous terms such as “reasonable,” 
“appropriate,” and “moderate” to characterize legitimate physical 
punishment and to distinguish it from abuse.59 These vague standards 
are then given meaning through the common law. Thus, children’s 
constitutional rights are also almost entirely ignored in the family-
discipline context, despite the fact that they crop up quite often in the 
institutional context. Within the family, unlike in the institutional 
context, the general understanding seems to be that children are 
without constitutional rights to avoid physical harm, except those 
conferred by statute or common law. Indeed, the Supreme Court 
famously held in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of 
Social Services60 that the Due Process Clause did not provide a cause 
of action to a child who was severely beaten by his father, even 
though social workers had been alerted to past abuse of the child and 
declined to remove him from the home.61 
In the medical-treatment context outside abortion and 
contraception, minors have long been subject to a common-law 
presumption that they are incapable of consenting on their own to 
healthcare and that parents are capable of providing informed 
consent on their behalf.62 There are a few circumstances in which 
those presumptions do not apply, but these circumstances arise from 
common-law and statutory entitlements, and do not appear to have 
 
 59. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-3-24 (LexisNexis 2005) (“reasonable and appropriate 
physical force”); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-34-1-15 (LexisNexis 2013) (“reasonable corporal 
punishment”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-18-5 (2006) (“force used is reasonable in manner and 
moderate in degree”). Statutes may privilege corporal punishment against criminal prosecution, 
civil actions, or both. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (2011) (immunity from criminal 
punishment); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-804 (LexisNexis 2013) (“Corporal punishment which 
would, but for this part, be considered to be reasonable discipline of a minor . . . may not be 
used as a basis for any civil or criminal action.”). 
 60. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
 61. Id. at 191. However, the parents’ constitutional rights may be involved in courts’ 
findings that parents have the right to punish their children within reasonable limits, to make 
medical decisions for them, and so forth. See, e.g., Sweaney v. Ada Cnty., 119 F.3d 1385, 1389–92 
(9th Cir. 1997) (considering the possibility that parents have a constitutional right to engage in 
reasonable corporal punishment, but ultimately rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that the right 
is clearly established). 
 62. Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy: Clarifying an Ageless Conundrum, 15 
HASTINGS L.J. 1265, 1266–67 (2000). 
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constitutional foundations.63 For example, a number of states have 
adopted “mature-minor” laws, which allow minors deemed 
sufficiently mature to consent to medical treatment without parental 
involvement.64 Much like those minors seeking a judicial bypass, 
mature minors in the healthcare context must be able to “appreciat[e] 
the nature, extent and probable consequences of the conduct 
consented to” and to “weigh the risks and benefits.”65 Likewise, all 
states have adopted statutes allowing at least some minors to consent 
on their own to some forms of healthcare—most commonly, 
treatment for sexually transmitted diseases, outpatient substance-
abuse and mental-health counseling, prenatal care, and treatment for 
sexual assault.66 Most likely, these exceptions reflect the fact that 
legislatures are concerned about the potential deterrent effects on the 
minor if parental consent were required, as well as the public-health 
implications (such as the spread of sexually transmitted diseases) that 
might result.67 
Nonetheless, in the vast majority of cases, parents are 
empowered to consent to medical care on behalf of their children, 
limited only in extreme situations by neglect or abuse laws that may 
prevent them from denying necessary care or perhaps from imposing 
unnecessary treatments.68 It is thus fair to say that parents routinely 
make decisions about medical care for their children that are 
 
 63. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-34-107 (2013); Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 
745 (Tenn. 1987). Elsewhere, I have questioned whether it is truly meaningful to speak of 
minors’ incapacity to consent and parents’ capacity to consent for them as constituting default 
rules or background presumptions against which states must legislate. B. Jessie Hill, Medical 
Decision-Making by and on Behalf of Adolescents: Reconsidering First Principles, 15 J. HEALTH 
CARE L. & POL’Y 37, 38 (2012). Nonetheless, I concede that they are accurate premises in the 
vast majority of cases. Id. at 50. 
 64. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8-4 (LexisNexis 2006); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 30/3-2 (2012); 
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-30-3 (LexisNexis 2011). 
 65. Cardwell, 724 S.W.2d at 746 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A cmt. 
b (1977), and W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, 
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 18, 115 (5th ed. 1984)). Relatedly, minors may 
be considered “emancipated” for the purposes of medical and other decisionmaking if they 
exhibit indicia of independence, such as living on their own, serving in the military, or marrying. 
See FAY A. ROZOVSKY, CONSENT TO TREATMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE § 5.2.3 (3d ed. Supp. 
2005). 
 66. HEATHER BOONSTRA & ELIZABETH NASH, MINORS AND THE RIGHT TO CONSENT TO 
HEALTH CARE, GUTTMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL’Y 4 (2000). 
 67. See, e.g., Walter Wadlington, Medical Decision Making for and by Children: Tensions 
Between Parent, State, and Child, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 311, 323–24. 
 68. Alicia Ouellette, Shaping Parental Authority over Children’s Bodies, 85 IND. L.J. 955, 
966–67 (2010). 
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medically indicated but not, strictly speaking, medically necessary or 
life-saving.69 Parents can choose among reasonable medical options 
with respect to antibiotics, tonsillectomies, and other such 
interventions for relatively minor ailments.70 
Activities such as body piercing, tattooing, cosmetic surgeries, 
circumcision, and other nontherapeutic interventions are similarly 
regulated by state law, but there is a dearth of case law indicating the 
constitutional limits of parental authority in this domain.71 The 
underlying assumption appears to be that parents have the legal right 
not only to choose among reasonable therapeutic alternatives, but 
also to authorize some nontherapeutic interventions. Thus, for 
example, commentators have noted the increasing prevalence of 
plastic surgeries performed on teens, presumably authorized by their 
parents in all cases.72 In most states, tattooing and piercing of minors 
are permitted when the parent agrees, but tattooing of minors is 
prohibited entirely in some states regardless of consent.73 A small 
number of states explicitly exclude ear piercing from their general 
body-piercing prohibitions, and two states specify that it is acceptable 
for a parent to permit tattooing of a minor only to cover up an 
existing tattoo.74 Texas law specifies that the consenting parent or 
guardian must “consider[] [it to] be in the best interest of the [minor] 
to cover” a particular tattoo.75 
 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See, e.g., Alicia Ouellette, Eyes Wide Open: Surgery to Westernize the Eyes of an Asian 
Child, 39 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 15, 16 (2009). In the 2000s, there have been widely publicized 
attempts to outlaw circumcision. See, e.g., Jennifer Medina, Efforts to Ban Circumcision Gain 
Traction in California, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2011, at A20. 
 72. Gilbert, supra note 58, at 14 (stating that 205,119 teenagers under eighteen had 
cosmetic procedures in 2007 and observing that ultimately, the decision depended on parents’ 
consent or financial support); Ouellette, supra note 58, at 129–30 (noting that almost 219,000 
cosmetic surgeries were performed on teens in 2010, along with approximately 12,000 Botox 
injections); id. at 136 (noting that parents generally have decisionmaking authority regarding 
cosmetic body modification in the medical context). 
 73. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, TATTOOS AND BODY PIERCINGS FOR 
MINORS (2013), available at http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/tattooing-and-body-
piercing.aspx. 
 74. See id. (Tennessee and Texas). These provisions appear to be motivated largely by a 
concern for minors who bear gang-related tattoos. Cf. In re Antonio C., 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 218, 
221–22 (Ct. App. 2000) (imposing a probation requirement on a juvenile of no further 
tattooing). 
 75. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 146.012(a-1)(1)(D) (West 2010). 
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An exception to the model of broad parental discretion exists 
only in those cases in which there is a strong likelihood of the parent 
confronting a conflict of interests—for example, when a parent seeks 
to permit a child to donate an organ or tissue to a sibling. In such 
cases, common-law rules appear to dictate that a court order is 
required for the sibling organ donation, and that the donation may 
proceed only if it is in the best interests of the donating minor.76 
Again, however, the standard adopted is explicitly grounded in the 
common law, without reference to constitutional rights.77 
Scholarly commentators have sometimes suggested that 
children’s constitutional right to bodily integrity may be violated 
when parents authorize, and physicians perform, invasive surgeries on 
children that have little or no therapeutic benefit for the child.78 For 
example, a controversial surgery sometimes performed on infants and 
toddlers is “normalization” surgery for children born with ambiguous 
genitalia—neither clearly male nor clearly female.79 This procedure, 
which often has no medical benefit, is permanent, highly invasive, and 
usually painful.80 Moreover, it often has long-term negative 
 
 76. Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319, 1326 (Ill. 1990); Rhonda Gay Hartman, Gault’s 
Legacy: Dignity, Due Process, and Adolescents’ Liberty Interests in Living Donation, 22 NOTRE 
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 67, 76 (2008); Rachel M. Dufault, Comment, Bone Marrow 
Donations by Children: Rethinking the Legal Framework in Light of Curran v. Bosze, 24 CONN. 
L. REV. 211, 220 (1991). Parents must also seek a court order for sterilization of a mentally 
incompetent child, whether minor or adult. Koll, supra note 7, at 246. 
 77. But see Hartman, supra note 76, at 86 (suggesting that medical decisionmaking by 
minors implicates constitutional due-process concerns). 
 78. Koll, supra note 7, at 254–61; Tamar-Mattis, supra note 7, at 91–93. Some cases have 
also recognized minor’s “liberty interest” in not being confined for medical treatment without 
due process. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 597 (1979); In re F.C. III, 2 A.3d 1201, 1214 
(Pa. 2010). 
 79. For an overview of medical treatment of intersex children, see generally GREENBERG, 
supra note 58; KATRINA KARKAZIS, FIXING SEX: INTERSEX, MEDICAL AUTHORITY, AND 
LIVED EXPERIENCE (2008). 
 80. See, e.g., Nancy Ehrenreich & Mark Barr, Intersex Surgery, Female Genital Cutting, and 
the Selective Condemnation of “Cultural Practices”, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 71, 105–14 
(2005) (detailing the harmful physical and psychological effects of normalization surgeries); 
Karen Gurney, Sex and the Surgeon’s Knife: The Family Court’s Dilemma . . . Informed Consent 
and the Specter of Iatrogenic Harm to Children with Intersex Characteristics, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 
625, 631–35 (2007). Though once widely accepted, normalization surgery has garnered 
significant opposition and advocates have worked to change the standard of care for infants with 
disorders of sexual development. GREENBERG, supra note 58, at 24–25. Nonetheless, the 
general assumption, in the absence of any relevant case law, appears to be that it is within 
parents’ discretion to choose surgery, even when not medically necessary. For example, the 
American Academy of Pediatrics consensus statement notes that parents “now seem to be less 
inclined to choose surgery for” certain less severe intersex conditions, implying that they 
nonetheless have the authority to do so. Peter A. Lee, Christopher P. Houk, S. Faisal Ahmed & 
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consequences for the affected individual.81 Legal scholars have argued 
that allowing such surgeries violates the infant’s right to bodily 
integrity.82 And a lawsuit brought in 2013 on behalf of a child who was 
subjected to the surgery while in foster care alleged both substantive 
and procedural due-process violations of the child’s bodily integrity 
right.83 This, however, remains one of the rare cases in which 
constitutional—rather than common-law and statutory—standards 
were invoked. 
Surprisingly, with the exception of reproductive healthcare, 
constitutional rights and entitlements have not permeated the law of 
therapeutic and nontherapeutic medical interventions on minors to 
any significant extent. If children possess a constitutional right to 
bodily integrity, it should be implicated in all of these disparate 
contexts—not limited to reproductive healthcare. Yet, cases involving 
corporal punishment seldom, if ever, make reference to minors’ rights 
in the healthcare context; similarly, cases dealing with minors’ rights 
to make autonomous health-care decisions rarely look to the abortion 
and contraception precedents.84 Nor do cases dealing with 
 
Ieuan A. Hughes, Consensus Statement on Management of Intersex Disorders, 118 PEDIATRICS 
e488, e489 (2006), available at http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/118/2/e488.full
.pdf+html (emphasis added); see also GREENBERG, supra note 58, at 32 (“Currently, parents can 
consent to these surgeries and they are not subject to an external oversight or approval.”). 
 81. Gurney, supra note 80, at 631–35. 
 82. See, e.g., Sara R. Benson, Hacking the Gender Binary Myth: Recognizing Fundamental 
Rights for the Intersexed, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 31, 43–50 (2005); Tamar-Mattis, supra 
note 7, at 90–93; Ryan L. White, Note, Preferred Private Parts: Importing Intersex Autonomy for 
M.C. v. Aaronson, 37 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 777, 821 (2014). The Cardozo Journal of Law and 
Gender has published a symposium on intersex and the law. Symposium, Intersex Education, 
Advocacy, & The Law, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 1 (2005).  
 83. Complaint at 4, M.C. v. Aaronson, No. 2:13-cv-01303-DCN (D.S.C. May 14, 2013). The 
district court denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss on grounds of qualified immunity, but 
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on January 26, 2015. M.C. ex rel. Crawford v. 
Amrhein, No. 13-2178, 2015 WL 310523, at *2, *5 (4th Cir. Jan. 26, 2015). Without deciding 
whether the surgery violated the infant’s constitutional right to bodily integrity, the Fourth 
Circuit held that the law on this issue was not clearly established at the time the surgery took 
place, in 2006. Id. at *4. The defendants were therefore entitled to qualified immunity. Id. 
 84. But see In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 326 (Ill. 1989) (citing Supreme Court precedent 
regarding minors’ reproductive rights, in dicta, to show “that no ‘bright line’ age restriction of 18 
is tenable in restricting the rights of mature minors, whether the rights be based on 
constitutional or other grounds”); see also Teitelbaum & Ellis, supra note 7 (examining minors’ 
ability to assert liberty rights, against the wishes of their parents, in a variety of contexts). 
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circumcision address minors’ right to bodily integrity, though parents’ 
constitutional rights are sometimes invoked.85 
Although it may be defensible to view the minor abortion cases 
as simply sui generis,86 it is not entirely clear how or why such 
doctrinal isolation can be justified. One might argue that pregnant 
minors are in a unique situation in that they are facing a decision with 
profound long-term effects on the minor’s future—a decision that 
cannot, moreover, be delayed until the minor reaches maturity. 
However, many minors—such as those suffering from terminal 
cancer, drug addiction, or sexually transmitted diseases—are virtually 
indistinguishable from pregnant minors in terms of the gravity of their 
situations and the need for immediate treatment. Moreover, as the 
joint opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey87 emphasized: “Roe . . . 
may be seen not only as an exemplar of Griswold liberty but as a 
rule . . . of personal autonomy and bodily integrity, with doctrinal 
affinity to cases recognizing limits on governmental power to 
mandate medical treatment or to bar its rejection.”88 This language 
suggests that the constitutional bodily integrity right is not limited to 
the right to choose abortion; courts’ failure to acknowledge the 
Constitution’s application beyond this domain is thus puzzling. 
Additionally, the common-law and constitutional frameworks 
regarding medical treatment use overlapping standards such as 
maturity and best interests. It is therefore particularly surprising that 
the constitutional bodily integrity right recognized in the minor 
abortion cases has not permeated the medical decisionmaking 
context. As a result, unresolved conflicts remain. For example, it is 
uncertain how the mature-minor doctrine fits with statutory 
provisions requiring parental consent for minors seeking abortions. 
On one hand, a statutory requirement of parental consent would 
seem to constitute an explicit derogation of the common-law doctrine, 
rendering the mature-minor rule a nullity in the abortion context. On 
the other hand, the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence 
reincorporates that standard in holding that mature minors have a 
 
 85. Cf. Oliner v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 431 N.Y.S.2d 271, 272 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (holding that a 
religious circumcision ritual should be performed on a newborn at the parent’s request to 
respect the parent’s religious rights). 
 86. See, e.g., Emily Buss, What Does Frieda Yoder Believe?, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 53, 61 
(1999). 
 87. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 88. Id. at 857. 
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constitutional right to seek abortions without parental consent—
obviously (if not explicitly) referencing the common-law doctrine.89 
Thus, the right of children to bodily integrity is only partially 
constitutionalized. It has been recognized in some contexts, such as 
abuse by state actors and access to abortion. In other contexts—such 
as corporal punishment by parents, medical treatment, and 
nontherapeutic interventions—it has largely been ignored, even 
though the right would appear to be equally relevant. The reason for 
this disconnect may appear obvious at first glance: when a parent, 
unlike a public-school teacher or public detention-facility officer, 
denies a child’s right to bodily integrity, there is no state action, and 
therefore constitutional protections are not implicated. The 
Constitution thus protects children in public institutions but not in the 
home. Yet, as explained below, this apparent state-action distinction 
is deceptive and ultimately unsatisfying. As this Article argues, there 
is in fact no acceptable logical or doctrinal reason for this disconnect.90 
C. The Nature and Scope of Minors’ Bodily Integrity Right 
Assuming minors have a constitutional right to bodily integrity—
whether within the family or outside it—what does that right look 
like? And can it be universalized such that it applies equally to 
infants, who lack decisional capacity entirely, and to teenagers who 
are nearly adults? As noted above, the doctrine regulating children’s 
bodies falls largely within the domain of family law and has been only 
partly constitutionalized. At the same time, it appears that the 
Supreme Court’s constitutional bodily integrity cases look to 
common-law standards to delineate the contours of the constitutional 
right. In the course of recognizing minors’ constitutional right to 
choose abortion without parental involvement, the Supreme Court 
invokes the mature-minor doctrine, as well as the best-interests-of-
the-child standard that is familiar to family law.91 These twin concerns 
 
 89. In one case, the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that a clinic was not liable for failing 
to comply with the state’s parental-notice law, in part because the minor was found to be a 
“mature minor.” The court also found, however, that the parental-notice law was 
unconstitutional. McGlothlin v. Bristol Obstetrics, Gynecology & Family Planning, Inc., No. 
03A01-9706-CV-00236, 1998 WL 65459, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 1998) (“Further as to the 
issue of plaintiff’s capacity to consent which is predicated upon T.C.A. 39-15-202, the Court 
finds that the record fails to rebut the presumption of capacity by the plaintiff to sign the 
consent to abortion document as a mature minor.”). 
 90. See infra Part III. 
 91. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643–44 (1979) (plurality opinion) (“A pregnant 
minor is entitled to such a proceeding to show either: (1) that she is mature enough and well 
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of the minor abortion cases—maturity and best interests—map neatly 
onto the two key aspects of the bodily integrity right as commonly 
understood: autonomy and bodily security. Especially in the case of 
older minors, who may be seeking control over their own medical 
care or access to nonmedical interventions, their maturity primarily 
entails a right to autonomy in making decisions about their own 
bodies, rather than a right to be secure in their person. For younger 
children, by contrast, the bodily integrity right primarily takes the 
form of a right not to be subjected to physical abuse, unnecessary 
medical treatment, and severe corporal punishment, rather than a 
right to autonomy per se. The right to this form of bodily security is 
essentially a right of children to have their best interests protected. 
These two forms of the bodily integrity right are arguably relevant to 
all minors, but the bodily security dimension is likely more important 
for younger minors whereas the autonomy right is often more 
important for older minors. 
The cases that have already recognized a constitutional bodily 
integrity right for minors speak of the right as one against “arbitrary” 
or “unjustified” intrusions on the minor’s bodily security.92 In one 
case involving an allegation of excessive corporal punishment by a 
public-school teacher, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals explained 
that the substantive due-process right to bodily integrity protected 
minors against “violations of personal rights of privacy and bodily 
security” that are “severe, . . . disproportionate to the need presented, 
and . . . inspired by malice or sadism.”93 Key to these understandings 
is a notion of protecting children from harm that is more than de 
minimis in quality, and that is not of such a nature as to be potentially 
beneficial to them.94 For example, a medically necessary surgery is a 
 
enough to make her abortion decision . . . independently of her parents’ wishes; or (2) that even 
if she is not able to make this decision independently, the desired abortion would be in her best 
interests.” (footnote omitted)); LESLIE J. HARRIS, LEE E. TEITELBAUM & CAROL A. 
WEISBROD, FAMILY LAW 589 (3d ed. 1996). 
 92. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673, 678 (1977) (“Among the historic 
liberties so protected was a right to be free from, and to obtain judicial relief for, unjustified 
intrusions on personal security.”). 
 93. Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980). 
 94. Cf. Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 451–52 (5th Cir. 1994) (“It is 
incontrovertible that bodily integrity [protected by the Fourteenth Amendment] is necessarily 
violated when a state actor sexually abuses a schoolchild. . . . [T]here is never any justification 
for sexually molesting a schoolchild, and thus, no state interest, analogous to the punitive and 
disciplinary objectives attendant to corporal punishment, which might support it.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
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serious intrusion that may result in serious pain, but it is presumably 
not a violation of a child’s right to bodily integrity if it relieves or 
protects the child from more serious illness or harm. 
Indeed, bodily integrity in the sense of the basic ability to protect 
one’s body from harm and unwanted intrusion is an essential aspect 
of the constitutional privacy doctrine in general, not simply as applied 
to children. Emphasizing the need for pure physical security, one 
scholar has similarly characterized the privacy right to bodily integrity 
as “a presumptive right to simple physical existence in and of itself.”95 
Yet, autonomy is also an important aspect of the traditional 
understanding of the right. In the context of privacy doctrine as 
applied to adults, autonomy has long played a central role. In Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, for example, the joint opinion explained that 
denying a woman the right to choose abortion “includes ‘the interest 
in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions.’”96 
Speaking of the right to privacy in general, Professor Tom Gerety 
contends that the essence of privacy is “control over who, if anyone, 
will share in the intimacies of our bodies,” which in his view is 
fundamental to human flourishing.97 Gerety continues: “All of this 
comes in the end to a control over the most basic vehicle of selfhood: 
the body. For control over the body is the first form of autonomy and 
the necessary condition, for those who are not saints or stoics, of all 
later forms.”98 Indeed, this description helpfully connects the concepts 
of bodily integrity, privacy, and autonomy.99 
The minor abortion cases recognize two separate but related 
rights, providing a model for a more general right of minors to bodily 
integrity. The first is a right to autonomy in making certain 
fundamental decisions, which is represented by the exception 
allowing mature minors to consent on their own. For example, a 
 
 95. Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1459 (1992). 
 96. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 859 (1992) (quoting Carey v. 
Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684–85 (1977)); see also id. at 857 (“Roe, however, may be 
seen not only as an exemplar of Griswold liberty but as a rule . . . of personal autonomy and 
bodily integrity . . . .”). Indeed, it is interesting that the Court cites Carey and several other cases 
involving minors in this portion of its opinion. Professor Khiara Bridges and others have noted 
the evolution of the Court’s language in substantive due-process cases from a rhetoric centered 
on “privacy” to one centered on “liberty,” a move that has de-emphasized the importance of the 
family as compared to the individual. See generally Khiara M. Bridges, Privacy Rights and 
Public Families, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 113, 137–45 (2011). 
 97. Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233, 266 (1977). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Thomas, supra note 95, at 1459. 
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concern for the autonomy of older, mature minors clarifies the 
Court’s holding in Bellotti v. Baird that courts could not decide on 
minors’ access to abortion based solely on their best interests, but 
rather that minors must be allowed to consent to an abortion if they 
are sufficiently mature to do so.100 The second is the right to 
protection against bodily harm, which is roughly represented by the 
best-interests prong allowing judges to grant minors access to 
abortion without parental consent if it would be in their best interests. 
Those twin aspects of minors’ bodily integrity rights assist in 
conceptualizing a bodily integrity right that can apply across factual 
contexts, both to older minors as well as to younger ones. For 
younger minors, it is the pure best-interests, or bodily protection, 
aspect of bodily integrity that is likely to be most relevant—for 
example in the form of protection from abuse and from unwarranted 
denial of medical care. For older minors, autonomy often comes into 
play, especially in the context of reproductive health and other forms 
of healthcare, as well as in choosing forms of bodily expression such 
as tattoos and piercings.101 It thus appears that the minor abortion 
cases can provide a model for a more universally recognized 
constitutional right of minors to bodily integrity. 
II.  CONFLICTING VIEWS OF THE FAMILY AND THE 
ROLE OF PARENTAL RIGHTS 
Thus far, this Article has discussed the notion of children’s 
constitutional right to bodily integrity as a freestanding right, whether 
against the state or against parents. However, any discussion of this 
right would be incomplete without an acknowledgement of the 
 
 100. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 650 (1979) (plurality opinion) (holding that the state 
“cannot constitutionally permit judicial disregard of the abortion decision of a minor who has 
been determined to be mature and fully competent to assess the implications of the choice she 
has made”); see also id. at 642 (noting the severe consequences of “denying a minor the right to 
make an important decision” such as the abortion decision). In addition, a large and growing 
literature recognizes the developing decisional capacity of adolescents and older minors, and 
calls on the law to grant minors autonomy rights that accord with their capacity. See, e.g., 
Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Whose Body Is It Anyway? An Updated Model of Healthcare 
Decision-Making Rights for Adolescents, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 251, 283–91 (2005); cf. 
Todres, supra note 11, at 1146–64 (urging that the law should take into account cultural 
understandings of and approaches to maturity). 
 101. Cf. Gowri Ramachandran, Freedom of Dress: State and Private Regulation of Clothing, 
Hairstyle, Jewelry, Makeup, Tattoos, and Piercing, 66 MD. L. REV. 11, 77–78 (2006) (questioning 
whether the state should be able to exercise its “usual parentalist role toward children” when 
body modification is concerned, due to the expressive and identity interests involved, and 
analogizing body-modification cases to minor abortion cases). 
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profound importance of parental rights with respect to the very same 
set of issues. Though the contours of the “family-privacy” or 
“parental-rights” doctrine are notoriously vague,102 there is no 
question that parental rights include some measure of parental 
control over children’s bodies. To the extent that such a right exists, 
moreover, it seems inevitably to increase parents’ authority and limit 
children’s authority with respect to children’s bodies.103 For example, 
the right is widely understood to ground parental discretion exercised 
in the context of body modification, medical decisionmaking, and 
corporal punishment.104 
The origins of the constitutional doctrine of family privacy may 
be traced to two Lochner-era cases, Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters. Despite Meyer’s and Pierce’s questionable origins in 
a constitutional doctrine guaranteeing not only the “liberty of parents 
and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children 
under their control,”105 but also the freedom to contract and the right 
to pursue an occupation,106 they have demonstrated considerable 
staying power. As recently as 2000, an eight-Justice majority of the 
Supreme Court affirmed the fundamental nature of parents’ rights to 
the custody and control of their children.107 
 
 102. See, e.g., Bruce C. Hafen, Children’s Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some 
Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their “Rights”, 1976 BYU L. REV. 605, 628 (“What 
the parental interest may mean—especially where it is pitted against the interests of children—
remains to be developed more fully.”); David D. Meyer, The Constitutionalization of Family 
Law, 42 FAM. L.Q. 529, 551 (2008) (noting the current uncertainty regarding the “boundaries 
and scope” of family privacy). 
 103. See generally Anne C. Dailey, Constitutional Privacy and the Just Family, 67 TUL. L. 
REV. 955, 986–87 (1993) (“The problem may be stated in simple terms: any allotment of liberty 
to the parents necessarily diminishes the liberty of the child; conversely, any enhancement of a 
child’s liberty curtails that of the parents.”); Hill, supra note 63, at 62–63 (“It should now be 
clear that parents’ rights to make health care decisions for their children are fundamentally in 
conflict with childrens’ rights to bodily integrity, at least where those rights apply—for example, 
in the case of mature minors.”). 
 104. See, e.g., Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1203 (10th Cir. 2003) (noting that the 
constitutional right of parents to control their children includes the right to direct their medical 
care); James G. Dwyer, Parental Entitlement and Corporal Punishment, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 189, 192–93 (2010) (noting the argument that parental rights ground parental authority 
to punish children for discipline). 
 105. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925). 
 106. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
 107. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000); see also David D. Meyer, Lochner 
Redeemed: Family Privacy After Troxel and Carhart, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1141 & n.85 
(2001) (noting that eight Justices recognized the fundamental quality of parental rights in Troxel 
v. Granville). 
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Yet, the Meyer and Pierce cases also gave rise to individual 
constitutional privacy rights, such as the right to use contraception 
and abortion.108 When these latter rights were applied to minors as 
well, an inevitable clash was created between children’s constitutional 
rights and parents’ constitutionally protected rights to family privacy 
and noninterference with their childrearing decisions.109 Given these 
decisions, any right of the child to make autonomous decisions 
naturally reduces the parent’s right to make those decisions on her 
behalf; any right of the child to claim the state’s protection against 
neglect, exploitation, or harm by her parents automatically entails 
greater intervention into the private realm of the family than the 
parent would wish. Yet both kinds of rights share a pedigree, given 
that they originate from the same doctrinal bloodline. 
In addition, the tension between parents’ rights to familial 
privacy and children’s rights to autonomy and protection arguably 
reflects a tension within broader philosophical approaches to the 
family—between liberal, individual-rights centered approaches and 
communitarian or “parentalist” approaches. The birth of children’s 
constitutional rights, as distinct from those of their parents, may be 
loosely viewed as an outcropping or extension of the liberal view, 
which emphasizes the state’s role in shaping future citizens and 
promoting liberal values, while still leaving room for parents to 
inculcate their own values. Familial rights, by contrast, fit more 
comfortably within the parentalist tradition, which embodies a 
traditional view, grounded in natural law, of the family as existing 
outside of, and largely beyond the reach of, the state. Neither 
tradition clearly dominates in constitutional jurisprudence.110 
In both traditions, of course, children are understood as 
individuals with at least some needs and entitlements, and in both 
traditions, families are accorded special status, requiring some 
deference or presumption of noninterference from the state. Where 
the two traditions differ is in how they mediate the potential conflict 
 
 108. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–153 (1973). 
 109. Dailey, supra note 103, at 986–87. 
 110. Cf. Vivian Hamilton, Principles of U.S. Family Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 31, 56 
(2006) (noting that family-privacy law has been shaped by conflicting strands of liberal 
individualism and Biblical traditionalism). The liberal and parentalist traditions roughly match 
two predominant approaches to childhood in family law: the children’s-rights approach, which 
reflects (and in many respects exceeds) the liberal viewpoint, and the dependency approach, 
which assimilates with the parentalist viewpoint. See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Restating 
Childhood, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 525, 540–41 (2014). 
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between the state’s interest in according the children rights that may 
be exercised without parental consent and the duty owed by the state 
to tolerate some distinctiveness among families, which may not 
always conform to the state’s desired value system. 
This Part further explores the liberal and parentalist views of the 
family, as well as the ways in which each of those contrasting 
approaches is embodied in case law. Because neither approach 
dominates, the law pertaining to children’s rights within the family 
evinces tremendous incoherence. In particular, disagreements 
between liberals and parentalists over the nature of the family and its 
relationship to the state result in disagreements over whether the 
state can be said to be acting, or intervening in the family, when the 
law delegates authority to parents over children’s bodies. 
A. The Liberal View of the Family 
1. An Overview of the Liberal View of the Family.  In evaluating 
the relationship between the family and the state, liberal theory tends 
to emphasize the importance of the family in serving the ends of the 
state. For example, Professor Linda McClain takes the position that 
families in democratic societies “are places of moral learning that may 
create the good person and may contribute to creating the good 
citizen,” in part by helping children acquire the values and capacities 
that will enable them to participate in democratic self-government.111 
One such capacity is the capacity for autonomy, which develops as a 
child matures. As such, both parents and governmental institutions, 
such as schools, should support children’s increasing claims to 
equality and increasing ability to make independent decisions.112 
Similarly, Professor Amy Gutmann argues that both parents and the 
state should act in a paternalistic manner toward children to ensure 
that they are eventually able to choose their own conception of the 
good life and to participate in democratic self-government.113 
 
 111. LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY, 
AND RESPONSIBILITY 67 (2006). As John Rawls explains, “the family is part of the basic 
structure of civil society,” largely because “one of its essential roles is to establish the orderly 
production and reproduction of society and of its culture from one generation to the next.” 
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 398 (2d ed. 1997).  
 112. MCCLAIN, supra note 111, at 68–70. 
 113. Amy Gutmann, Children, Paternalism, and Education: A Liberal Argument, 9 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFF. 338, 349–50 (1980); cf. Dailey, supra note 103, at 993 (describing the Supreme Court’s 
view of “the family as facilitating the development of responsible individuals” and thus as “an 
instrument of the liberal state”). 
HILL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/25/2015  12:23 PM 
1322 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:1295 
Liberal theorists conceive of the relationship among a child, her 
parents, and the state as deriving from this basic structure and 
function of the family. According to McClain, the role of the state vis-
à-vis the family is to instill children with civic virtues and to protect 
children from harm, as in the case of abuse or neglect, but to abstain 
from forcing upon them any particular substantive vision of what 
constitutes a good or worthy life.114 To use explicitly Rawlsian terms, 
the state should avoid imposing the dictates of any particular 
“comprehensive . . . doctrine[].”115 These civic virtues, which the state 
is justified in imposing on children, are the fundamental values that a 
democratic society requires its citizens to accept, such as equality and 
toleration for diversity.116 Thus, the state can and should act to mold 
children into good citizens, which involves protecting them to 
preserve their future options and capacities and allowing them to 
exercise some autonomy commensurate with their developing 
abilities. 
The state’s obligation to protect children and instill civic virtues 
still leaves room for some measure of family privacy in the liberal 
vision. Because the state must refrain from imposing comprehensive 
doctrines—indeed, because it must avoid imposing any values on 
families except the most basic values fundamental to democratic self-
government—a large discretionary realm remains for parents to teach 
children their own values and beliefs and to make decisions about 
their children’s best interests.117 As Gutmann puts it, “Some values 
must be imposed in any case. What is at issue here is not whose values 
but what values ought to be imposed upon children.”118 Thus, parents 
remain free to cultivate their values in their children, whereas the 
state maintains the authority to impose those values necessary to 
fostering future democratic citizenship and maintaining a full range of 
opportunities for children’s futures.119 
Within the liberal philosophical framework, the state would have 
the power to protect children’s bodily integrity against parental abuse 
or neglect, consonant with its authority to protect individuals from 
 
 114. MCCLAIN, supra note 111, at 78–84. 
 115. Id. at 47; see JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 36–39 (1993). 
 116. Professor Linda McClain writes of the government’s obligation to foster capacity, 
equality, and responsibility, MCCLAIN, supra note 111, at 4; Anne Dailey speaks of “family 
justice,” Dailey, supra note 103, at 1016–18. 
 117. See, e.g., MCCLAIN, supra note 111, at 47–48; Gutmann, supra note 113, at 350–53. 
 118. Gutmann, supra note 113, at 351. 
 119. Cf. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE LIBERAL STATE 154–59 (1980). 
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physical harm—physical security being a prerequisite for children’s 
future citizenship.120 Beyond actions that constitute neglect, abuse, or 
that otherwise inhibit children’s future choices, however, it seems that 
in most cases the state would be required to tolerate differences in 
parental decisionmaking with respect to children’s bodies.121 
At the same time, some liberal theorists contend that 
adolescents, who are in the process of developing the capacity to 
exercise the sort of autonomy that adult citizens may exercise, should 
in some cases be authorized to exercise that autonomy regardless of 
their parents’ wishes.122 This is because liberalism views consent, and 
therefore the capacity for rationality, as a prerequisite to and basis for 
individual-autonomy rights.123 As Gutmann explains “adolescents 
must be granted some freedoms in order to help develop their 
capacities to exercise their freedoms as adults,” but only in ways that 
allow them to expand, rather than restrict, their future options.124 
This understanding of the relationship between autonomy and 
freedom could lead to some idiosyncratic results. It might suggest, for 
example, that minors ought to be permitted in some circumstances to 
choose abortion but not childbearing without parental consent, given 
that nonprocreation would keep the minor’s future options open but 
carrying a child to term would foreclose many future opportunities. 
Similarly, liberal theory might support a terminally ill minor’s right to 
accept but not to refuse life-prolonging medical treatment. 
Moreover, the state would have a stake in judging the reasons 
why parents seek to make certain choices with respect to their 
children’s bodies because those reasons may indicate the values that 
are being supported and conveyed. Thus, the liberal view might 
accept a parent’s decision to deny a child medical care because that 
parent has made the informed judgment that the medical intervention 
is likely to cause the child significant discomfort with only a small 
chance of remedying the underlying condition—for example, in the 
 
 120. See, e.g., MCCLAIN, supra note 111, at 79–80 (mentioning the state’s parens patriae 
interest in children’s health and safety, and noting that “if a religiously motivated family 
practice seriously impaired a child’s development . . . , this would overcome the normal 
deference to parental authority and trigger a strong governmental interest in prevention, 
intervention, or amelioration”). 
 121. Cf. AMY GUTMANN, IDENTITY IN DEMOCRACY 69–73 (2003) (discussing parental 
discretion with respect to male and female circumcision). 
 122. See, e.g., Gutmann, supra note 113, at 354–55. 
 123. See, e.g., id. at 339–40. 
 124. Id. at 354–55. 
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case of an experimental cancer treatment. Such reasoning indicates 
the decision is being made with the child’s best interests in mind. The 
liberal view might, however, reject a parent’s decision to deny 
medical care based on a judgment that it is better for the child to die 
than to violate the parent’s religious beliefs, because that judgment 
shows minimal concern for the child or her value as a citizen. Or, the 
liberal state may judge mild corporal punishment that is practiced to 
discipline a child differently from even mild physical pain inflicted on 
a child out of a sadistic desire to harm.125 Relatedly, an evaluation of a 
minor’s reason for making a particular decision—for example, 
seeking an abortion—would be relevant to determining whether the 
minor possesses sufficient capacity to exercise at least limited 
decisionmaking authority. 
Finally, although liberalism views the state as limited in its 
authority to impose particular values on family life, we can infer that 
liberal philosophy considers the state to be the ultimate source of 
authority over children. The authority that parents have over their 
children may be seen as delegated by the state, which is in charge of 
determining the boundaries of its own power. This places liberal 
theories of the family in direct contradiction to natural-law-derived 
parentalist theories, which hold that parents’ authority over their 
children is inherent, and that the state lacks authority to intervene 
except perhaps in cases of abuse or neglect, in which the natural 
family can be said to no longer exist in any meaningful sense.126 
2. The Liberal View of the Family in Case Law.  Many cases—
particularly constitutional-rights cases from the 1970s onward—
appear to embody the liberal perspective.127 Unsurprisingly, the 
abortion cases are the paradigm. As one would expect based on the 
liberal understanding of the state’s role in the family, these 
constitutional cases show a preoccupation with the parents’ reasoning 
process, and even sometimes an eliding of roles of parent and state. 
The state becomes, in some cases, a stand-in for the parent and vice 
versa. This result should be expected, given that liberalism views the 
 
 125. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 126. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need 
for Legal Alternatives when the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 
887–88 (1984). 
 127. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 
U.S. 678, 697–99 (1977); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976). 
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state as central and the families as acting, to a great extent, in the 
service of the state. 
For example, in Bellotti, the seminal minor-rights abortion case, 
a woman representing a “class of Massachusetts parents having 
unmarried minor daughters who then were, or might become, 
pregnant” was permitted to intervene to defend the statute.128 Yet, 
although the parents attempted to raise their own rights as parents to 
consent or withhold consent to their children’s decisions, the Bellotti 
Court never directly addressed those claims and instead recognized 
them only as an aspect of the state’s interest.129 
Furthermore, although Supreme Court jurisprudence gives 
minors a fairly wide range of autonomy with respect to the abortion 
decision—arguably more than they possess with respect to other 
important medical-treatment decisions, for example—it also 
demonstrates a strong preoccupation with minors’ reasoning and 
decisionmaking process in this context. In practice, courts hearing 
judicial-bypass petitions are consumed with evaluating the quality of 
the reasoning by the minors who come before them seeking abortions 
without parental consent. In any of thirty-seven states,130 minors can 
avoid parental involvement in their abortion decisions only by going 
to court and seeking a judge’s approval through a judicial-bypass 
hearing. Professor Carol Sanger has examined the structure of these 
hearings, finding that courts often focus on the decisionmaking 
process of the teens who are seeking an abortion.131 Indeed, though 
the law is largely lacking in standards for determining whether a 
minor is mature enough to make the abortion decision on her own, an 
examination of her thought process is one obvious way to reach such 
a determination.132 
 
 128. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 627. 
 129. Id. at 638–39, 648. 
 130. Thirty-eight states require parental involvement in minors’ abortion decisions. Of 
those, twenty-six require parental consent and twelve require only parental notification. Thirty-
seven states have alternate judicial-bypass procedures available. GUTTMACHER INST., STATE 
POLICIES IN BRIEF: PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT IN MINORS’ ABORTIONS 2 (2015), available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_PIMA.pdf. 
 131. Carol Sanger, Decisional Dignity: Teenage Abortion, Bypass Hearings, and the Misuse 
of Law, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 409, 430 (2009). 
 132. See id. at 430–31. According to Professor Sanger, such hearings perform other functions 
as well: they are themselves punitive, shaming devices. Comparing bypass hearings to sixteenth-
century French “pardon tales,” whereby those who had committed capital offenses sought the 
mercy of the sovereign, Sanger observes that teenagers’ bypass narratives “similarly seek to 
persuade by accounting for past actions” in a compelled story of remorse. Id. at 460, 466–67. 
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The Supreme Court cases also evince an unusual concern with 
parental reasoning and decisionmaking processes. Early in the Bellotti 
litigation, the Supreme Court decided to certify several questions 
about statutory construction to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court.133 In particular, the Court was concerned with whether an 
arbitrary third-party veto was created by the statutory phrasing, 
which required parental consent but provided for a judicial order 
bypassing the consent requirement “for good cause shown.”134 The 
district court thus inquired of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court what standards were to be applied in determining whether the 
abortion could go forward, both by the parents and by the court 
hearing a bypass petition.135 In response, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court asserted that both the court and the minor’s parents 
were permitted only to consider the minor’s best interests in deciding 
whether to allow the abortion.136 Presumably, this meant the parents 
could not rely on their own religious or other ethical beliefs in 
withholding consent. With respect to parental decisionmaking under 
the statute, the court added: “There is, of course, no penalty if a 
parent does not apply the proper standard in deciding whether to 
consent to his or her child’s request for consent to an abortion. Our 
answer may be of assistance, however, in guiding parents’ 
consideration of the question . . . .”137 The court’s caveat 
notwithstanding, it would be an understatement to say that it is 
unusual for courts to examine parental decisionmaking within intact 
families so closely; nonetheless, this micromanagement is arguably 
quite consistent with a liberal view of the family and the state’s not-
insignificant role in shaping it. 
This approach to parental decisionmaking is not just present in 
constitutional cases. In the case of In re Marriage of Boldt,138 the 
Supreme Court of Oregon addressed the issue of who had 
decisionmaking authority over a twelve-year-old boy’s circumcision, 
when the divorced parents disagreed on the issue.139 The court first 
stated, in a more parentalist vein, that the law granted “authority [to] 
the custodial parent to make medical decisions for his or her child, 
 
 133. Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 134 (1976). 
 134. Id. at 134–35. 
 135. Baird v. Attorney Gen., 360 N.E.2d 288, 292 (Mass. 1977). 
 136. Id. at 292–93. 
 137. Id. at 293. 
 138. In re Marriage of Boldt, 176 P.3d 388 (Or. 2008). 
 139. Id. at 389–91. 
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including decisions involving elective procedures and decisions that 
may involve medical risks.”140 But the opinion quickly took a liberal 
turn. The court emphasized that, “although circumcision is an 
invasive medical procedure that results in permanent physical 
alteration of a body part and has attendant medical risks, the decision 
to have a male child circumcised for medical or religious reasons is 
one that is commonly and historically made by parents in the United 
States.”141 Thus, the parents’ reasons for choosing the procedure were 
scrutinized by the court and found to be appropriate. Although 
purporting to take a hands-off approach to parental decisionmaking 
in this domain, the court felt compelled to offer a liberal justification 
for its ruling by situating the decision as normal and socially 
acceptable.142 
In similar terms, the court in Hart v. Brown143 focused on the 
reasonableness of the parents’ decision to authorize kidney 
transplantation from one seven-year-old twin to the other.144 
Articulating its standard for validating the operation, the court stated 
that “the natural parents would be able to substitute their consent for 
that of their minor children after a close, independent and objective 
investigation of their motivation and reasoning.”145 The court 
ultimately found that the parents’ reasoning was “morally sound,”146 
based on the testimony of clergy and psychiatrists, and that the 
parents’ “motivation and reasoning are favorably reviewed by a 
community representation which includes a court of equity.”147 
The legality of a parent’s corporal punishment of a child also 
depends in part on the reasons or intent behind the act. In one case, 
the court showed a particular concern with the parent’s reasons for 
punishing the child in a particular way, even after suggesting that the 
 
 140. Id. at 393. 
 141. Id. at 394. 
 142. In addition, the court seemed uncomfortable with the prospect of forcing circumcision 
on an unwilling twelve-year-old: it therefore remanded for the trial court to determine whether 
the child truly agreed to the procedure, as the father had asserted, not because of the minor’s 
rights, but because opposition by the child might “affect [the] father’s ability to properly care 
for” him. Id. at 394–95. 
 143. Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972). 
 144. Id. at 387. 
 145. Id. at 390. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 391. 
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parent’s state of mind was irrelevant.148 After first announcing that 
“we evaluate a claim of abuse by looking to the harm suffered by the 
child, rather than the mental state of the accused abuser, because 
‘[t]he main goal of [the relevant law] is to protect children,’” the New 
Jersey appellate court then proceeded to evaluate the 
appropriateness of a mother’s striking of her child in precisely those 
purportedly irrelevant terms.149 Although first noting that the 
resulting injury was not particularly serious, the court then took into 
account “the reasons underlying” the mother’s actions as well as the 
fact that she “accepted full responsibility for her actions” and “was 
contrite.”150 Thus, the case law generally supports the parent’s 
authority to use nonexcessive force for disciplinary purposes, but not 
for other purposes.151 Indeed, one court referenced a nineteenth-
century English case holding that the whipping of a two-and-one-half-
year-old was excessive on the ground that “although a father might 
correct a child, such physical force . . . was beyond her capacity to 
understand.”152 Presumably, the punishment could not be expected to 
perform its corrective or expressive function.153 
B. The Parentalist View of the Family 
1. An Overview of the Parentalist View of the Family.  The 
parentalist or communitarian perspective views the family as a 
bulwark against the standardizing force of the state, rather than as an 
instrument the state uses to fulfill its own ends.154 Parentalism is 
 
 148. Dep’t of Children & Families v. K.A., 996 A.2d 1040, 1045 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2010). 
 149. Id. at 1044 (quoting G.S. v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 723 A.2d 612 (N.J. 1999). 
 150. Id. at 1045. 
 151. Dwyer, supra note 104, at 192–93. But see Sweaney v. Ada Cnty., 119 F.3d 1385, 1391–
92 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that a mother did not have a clearly established constitutional right 
to hit her son with a belt without state interference as a means of discipline). 
 152. In re Rodney C., 398 N.Y.S.2d 511, 515 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1977) (citing R. v. Griffin, [1869] 
11 Cox 402). 
 153. The fundamental right to control the education and upbringing of one’s children is 
often mentioned in passing, and some commentators have noted that this constitutional right 
may ground the law’s privileging of reasonable corporal punishment. See, e.g., Willis v. State, 
888 N.E.2d 177, 180 (Ind. 2008); Deana A. Pollard, Banning Corporal Punishment: A 
Constitutional Analysis, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 447, 453–56 (2002). Within the parental corporal-
punishment context, however, constitutional claims do not appear to have much traction. 
Sweaney, 119 F.3d at 1391–92 (holding that parental rights do not prevent the state from 
imposing criminal penalties when corporal punishment on a child is deemed excessive). 
 154. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, Parents, Religion, and Schools: Reflections on Pierce, 70 
Years Later, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1194, 1209–10, 1222–23 (1997) (illustrating the value of 
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concerned with protecting the right of parents to immerse their 
children in their own values, even when those values conflict with the 
majority’s.155 Parentalists worry that “abandoning [youth] to their 
‘rights’” is a very poor way to serve children’s interests and needs, 
which sound in care more than in liberation.156 In these scholars’ view, 
parents are clearly the superior decisionmakers for their children 
because they love them and want what is best for them.157 In contrast 
to liberal theorists, parentalists tend to believe that parents have 
some inherent rights over their children—by most accounts grounded 
in natural law—that extend well beyond the “right” to do what is in 
the children’s best interests and to shape them into well-qualified 
future members of the polity.158 
Of course, even the fiercest proponents of parental rights 
support exceptions to parental authority when the state’s interest is 
truly compelling—as in cases of abuse or neglect—but they would 
preserve a wide range of parental control when parents’ actions fall 
short of such extremes.159 Where they differ from liberal theorists, 
then, is that parentalists would limit the state’s authority to intervene 
in the family to cases of abuse, neglect, and unfitness, whereas liberals 
would grant the state broader authority to create rules that would 
encourage the child’s development of basic citizenship values and 
exposure to many possible understandings of the good life. 
Moreover, parentalists are critical of the view that minors with 
some capacity for autonomy can and should be permitted to make 
 
families as potential centers of dissent and rejecting the “liberal vision” of the family as a “little 
citizen-making factory” that assists the state in its standardizing mission). 
 155. See, e.g., Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 937, 948–50, 971, 998–99 (1996) (suggesting that, following the liberal approach, many 
parents will nonetheless want “to have it both ways: to use the state’s power to privilege and 
enhance their efforts to pass on their values to their children, while undermining the ability of 
parents in the minority to do the same”); Gutmann, supra note 113, at 351 (noting the argument 
that under the liberal view, the democratic state “is simply imposing its values upon children”). 
 156. Hafen, supra note 102, at 651 (quoting PANEL DISCUSSION REMARKS OF ALBERT 
SOLNIT, CHILD ADVOCACY CONFERENCE, MADISON, WISCONSIN, SEPT. 26, 1975). 
 157. Id. at 651–53; see also MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S 
RIGHTS 46 (2005) (arguing that “the core of the parental rights doctrine guarantees children at 
least that the important decisions in their lives will be made by those who are most likely to 
know them best and to care the most for them”); cf. Brian Bix, Philosophy, Morality, and 
Parental Authority, 40 FAM. L.Q. 7, 17–19 (2006) (arguing that parental priority may be justified 
by parents’ superiority as decisionmakers for their children). 
 158. E.g., Hafen, supra note 102, at 616–17 (describing “plenary” parental authority over 
children derived from “natural individual rights” that “are thought to antedate the state in 
American political philosophy”); id. at 619–22. 
 159. GUGGENHEIM, supra note 157, at 36–37; Hafen, supra note 102, at 617. 
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decisions for themselves commensurate with that autonomy.160 In 
their view, as long as a minor child is still within parental custody and 
control, there is no warrant for overriding parental prerogatives.161 
Finally, whereas an evaluation of parents’ and children’s reasons is 
perfectly consonant with liberalism’s understanding of the role of the 
state, parentalists would find such evaluation to be overly intrusive. 
So long as parents are fit, the state is neither competent nor 
authorized to evaluate the parental decisionmaking process; the 
state’s inability to interfere in the family is virtually jurisdictional in 
nature.162 Thus, as applied to decisionmaking over children’s bodies, it 
seems that any parental decision falling short of abuse or neglect 
could not be regulated—including practices, such as circumcision, 
tattooing, and piercing, that are permanent and may affect the child’s 
future options or identity.163 The notion of a child’s right to bodily 
integrity, separate and apart from the parent’s rights, is therefore 
largely inconsistent with the parentalist perspective. 
2. The Parentalist View of the Family in Case Law.  The language 
of cases such as Meyer and Pierce reflect a parentalist point-of-view. 
These cases emphasize that the Constitution supports parents’ right 
to avoid the state’s “standardiz[ing]” and indoctrinating force when it 
comes to children.164 Indeed, one scholar has persuasively 
demonstrated that these cases view the child as mere property of the 
parents, and that the briefs in Pierce drew explicitly upon natural-law 
views of parental authority as natural and god-given.165 In Pierce, for 
example, the Supreme Court sweepingly proclaimed that “[t]he 
fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this 
Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize 
 
 160. See, e.g., Gutmann, supra note 113, at 354–55. 
 161. Hafen, supra note 102, at 648–49. 
 162. Cf. Bix, supra note 157, at 19 (arguing that, for reasons of both family privacy and 
institutional incompetence, “courts should not be investigating how good the reasons are” for 
certain parental decisions). 
 163. As discussed below, the definitions of abuse and neglect are themselves somewhat 
malleable. See infra notes 281–87 and accompanying text; see also Ian Hacking, The Making and 
Molding of Child Abuse, 17 CRITICAL INQUIRY 253, 253 (1991) (arguing that the general 
conception of child abuse has been in flux for more than thirty years); Hafen, supra note 102, at 
617–18 (noting that “judicial perceptions of abuse and neglect have varied over time”). 
 164. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 
402 (1923). 
 165. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and the Child 
as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1102 (1992). 
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its children” through control over education.166 Indeed, the Court 
continued, “[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State; those 
who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with 
the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional 
obligations.”167 For support, the Court drew upon its decision two 
years earlier in Meyer, in which it condemned as unconstitutional the 
Nebraska legislature’s “desire . . . to foster a homogeneous people” 
through a law prohibiting the teaching of foreign languages in the 
schools, and compared the state’s vision to the familial dystopias of 
Plato’s Republic and ancient Sparta, in which children were raised by 
the community rather than their own parents.168 
In emphasizing this concern about enforced homogeneity and 
“communal ownership” of children, Meyer and Pierce arguably reflect 
a fear of totalitarian influence by the state, against which family 
privacy serves as a necessary protection.169 Indeed, this 
antitotalitarianism is also one plausible understanding of the goal and 
purpose of the privacy doctrine itself.170 The constitutional law of 
privacy, according to one scholar, is concerned with preventing “a 
society standardized and normalized, in which lives are too 
substantially or too rigidly directed.”171 The concern would appear to 
be particularly great with respect to excessive intervention in the 
family, which is often viewed as both a refuge from society at large 
and as a place for the private formation of moral values and beliefs—
even if those values and beliefs differ from those of society.172 
Similarly, early provisions of law apparently enacted for the 
protection of children—for example, laws preventing minors from 
entering military service without parental consent—were not 
understood to confer any rights upon the children themselves and 
were held to be waivable by the minors’ parents.173 Even in Prince v. 
 
 166. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402. 
 169. This is the view of Professor Barbara Bennett Woodhouse. Woodhouse, supra note 
165, at 1089–91. 
 170. Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 784 (1989). 
 171. Id. 
 172. See, e.g., SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 26 (1989) 
(describing the conventional or idealized view of the family); Frances E. Olsen, The Family and 
the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1504–05 (1983); 
Woodhouse, supra note 165, at 1090. 
 173. Morrissey v. Perry, 137 U.S. 157, 157 (1890). 
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Massachusetts,174 which affirmed the power of the state to interfere 
with parental decisions by applying child-labor laws, the Court still 
endorsed the parentalist perspective in dicta. For example, the Court 
stated that “the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in 
the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation 
for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder,” and that 
there is a “private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.”175 
This language, which indicates the state’s powerlessness to control 
family life and affirms the notion of a sort of pre- or extrapolitical set 
of “obligations” that ground parental rights, is steeped in the 
parentalist mindset. 
Deference to parents, rather than a concern for the interests of 
either the child or the state, thus drives the logic of those early 
parentalist cases. In light of Meyer, Pierce, and Prince, more modern 
cases, too, evince a strain of parentalism. For example, Troxel v. 
Granville—in which the Justices reaffirmed by an eight-to-one vote 
that family privacy is a fundamental constitutional right—is 
permeated with parentalist language.176 In that case, the Court 
considered a Washington state statute that allowed any person to 
petition for visitation rights to a child and allowed the court to grant 
visitation merely on a finding that it would be in the child’s best 
interests.177 The Supreme Court found the statute insufficiently 
deferential to parental rights.178 Emphasizing that the statute did not 
require a showing of parental unfitness, the Court assumed that the 
state was disabled from interfering in the private family domain on a 
mere determination of best interests.179 Moreover, the statute 
privileged the government’s decisionmaking over the parents’: 
[T]he Washington statute places the best-interest determination 
solely in the hands of the judge. Should the judge disagree with the 
parent’s estimation of the child’s best interests, the judge’s view 
 
 174. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
 175. Id. at 166. 
 176. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (plurality opinion) (noting the “fundamental 
right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children”); 
id. at 66 (discussing “broad parental authority” (quoting Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 
(1979))); id. at 68–69 (“[S]o long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), 
there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family 
to further question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing 
of that parent’s children.”). 
 177. Id. at 60. 
 178. Id. at 67. 
 179. Id. at 68–69. 
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necessarily prevails. Thus, in practical effect, in the State of 
Washington a court can disregard and overturn any decision by a fit 
custodial parent concerning visitation whenever a third party 
affected by the decision files a visitation petition, based solely on the 
judge’s determination of the child’s best interests.180 
This Court’s distress over the state court’s readiness to intervene 
stands in stark contrast to the holdings in Bellotti and other cases in 
which the state courts closely scrutinize parental decisionmaking 
despite the parents’ unquestioned fitness.181 
Some state court cases have also assumed the parentalist 
viewpoint. For example, in Oliner v. Lenox Hill Hospital,182 a New 
York court found that a couple had the right, as parents, to have their 
newborn son circumcised by a religious practitioner called a mohel, 
rather than by a physician.183 The court even appeared to treat the 
parents as the patients, rather than the child, holding that to deny the 
circumcision would violate a state law protecting “patient[s’] civil and 
religious liberties.”184 In a similar vein, the Delaware Supreme Court 
held that parents could not be required to allow their three-year-old 
child to undergo chemotherapy, which had a 40 percent chance of 
success in his case.185 Although the court acknowledged the child’s 
interests, it also emphasized the “primacy of the familial unit” and the 
“[p]arental authority to make fundamental decisions for minor 
children,” in ultimately upholding the parents’ right to deny 
treatment.186 
Finally, many commentators consider Parham v. J.R.187 to be a 
profoundly parentalist case.188 Decided the same year as Bellotti, 
 
 180. Id. at 67. 
 181. Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386, 390–91 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972); Baird v. Attorney Gen., 
360 N.E.2d 288, 292–93 (Mass. 1977); Dep’t of Children & Families v. K.A., 996 A.2d 1040, 1045 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010). 
 182. Oliner v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 431 N.Y.S. 2d 271 (Sup. Ct. 1980). 
 183. Id. at 272. 
 184. Id. at 272 (citing N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2803-c (McKinney 2011)). 
 185. Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1110 (Del. 1991). 
 186. Id. at 1115. 
 187. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979). 
 188. Janet L. Dolgin, The Fate of Childhood: Legal Models of Children and the Parent-Child 
Relationship, 61 ALB. L. REV. 345, 391–92 (1997); But see Ouellette, supra note 68, at 971 
(“Although Parham is frequently cited as a strong authority for parental rights and as the case 
that reversed the trend toward protecting children’s rights, it is actually a case in which the court 
found enough risk of error in parental judgment about what is in a child’s best interests that it 
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Parham dealt with the liberty interest of children whose parents 
wished to commit them to mental hospitals, often indefinitely.189 
“[A]bsent a finding of neglect or abuse,” the Court held, the parents’ 
determination of the child’s best interests should normally be 
respected, and they should “retain a substantial, if not the dominant, 
role in the decision.”190 The parents’ decision would be subject to 
review by an independent third party, but not necessarily by a state 
agent—a staff physician’s approval would suffice.191 Yet, it is less 
recognized that Parham contains elements of the liberal perspective 
as well. The Court’s recognition of a liberty right of children that 
applies to counteract the traditional presumption in favor of parental 
decisionmaking is in fact rather unusual; few other medical decisions, 
besides abortion, are constitutionally required to be subjected to any 
outside scrutiny. Indeed, the Court in Parham even discussed how the 
neutral party should make the decision, specifying that the child must 
be interviewed and all aspects of his background taken into account.192 
C. Summary 
The parentalist and liberal perspectives coexist within 
constitutional privacy doctrine. The presence of these conflicting 
viewpoints on the nature of the family and the source of family 
authority has led to a notable incoherence within the case law. 
Indeed, this conflict may be partly responsible for the fact that 
children are recognized as independent rights-holders in some 
contexts but not others: the liberal individual-rights perspective 
dominates abortion jurisprudence, which is of relatively recent 
vintage, whereas more traditional notions hold sway with respect to 
corporal punishment and medical decisionmaking.193 
Another consequence of these conflicting perspectives, discussed 
below, is that state action is unusually difficult to identify in cases 
involving children’s right to bodily integrity within the family. 
Whether one perceives that the state has acted or not is a function of 
one’s baseline understanding of the relationship between the family 
 
held that the constitution required procedural protections for the child before the parental 
decision could be implemented.”). 
 189. Parham, 442 U.S. at 587. 
 190. Id. at 604. 
 191. Id. at 604–07. 
 192. Id. at 606–07. 
 193. Cf. Hamilton, supra note 110, at 33 (arguing that the conflicting traditions informing 
family law have caused its incoherence). 
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and the state. If, as liberal philosophy assumes, the state is the source 
of all legitimate coercive force within society and is understood as 
simply delegating broad discretion to parents to make decisions for 
their children without state approval or intervention, then the state is, 
in some important sense, acting whenever it delegates authority to 
parents to make decisions on behalf of their children, who are 
themselves rights-holders. However, if parental authority over 
children preexists the state and cannot be touched by it, as 
parentalists and natural-law theorists assume, then the state acts only 
when it removes parental authority, not when it grants it. The 
parentalist perspective views removing parental authority over 
children as an intervention within the family, whereas allowing 
parental control is not. 
The conflicting perspectives pervade the case law pertaining to 
minors’ bodily integrity rights, rendering the concept of state action 
incoherent. For example, in Danforth, the Supreme Court struck 
down a statute requiring parental consent for minors seeking 
abortions, stating that “the State does not have the constitutional 
authority to give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, 
veto over the decision of the physician and his patient to terminate 
the patient’s pregnancy.”194 The case thus figures state action, 
according to the liberal perspective, as the allocation of control to the 
parent over the minor’s abortion decision. From the parentalist 
perspective, however, one could just as easily understand parental-
consent laws, which permit certain minors to access abortions without 
parental involvement, as intervening in the family to reduce parental 
rights.195 Similarly, if there is state action when the law requires 
 
 194. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976). It is notable that 
the state seemingly can and does give the veto right over the minor’s decision to a judge—by 
means of the judicial-bypass procedure—just not to a minor’s parent. Moreover, not unlike Roe, 
Danforth speaks as much about the physician as it does about the patient, thus suggesting that 
Danforth is in fact a case about physician’s rights. Nonetheless, it remains one of the strongest 
statements in the law of minors’ health-care autonomy rights, and the physicians’-rights 
rationale has not found support in later cases. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (describing the physician’s constitutional rights in the abortion context as 
“derivative of the woman’s position”). 
 195. In Bellotti v. Baird, a class of parents of unmarried minors had intervened on the side of 
the defendant and raised an independent claim of parental rights in the Bellotti litigation, but 
that claim was never directly addressed. Instead, the Court converted the apparent 
constitutional claim for violation of the parents’ fundamental rights—through state laws that 
apparently granted minors permission to seek abortions without parental consent in some 
circumstances—into a mere “interest” in family integrity and parental decisionmaking that the 
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minors to seek parental consent for abortion, then there should 
logically also be state action when the common law grants parents the 
authority to make medical-treatment decisions for their children.196 
However, that doctrinal field is not permeated by constitutional 
claims, as one would expect, if courts understood states to be acting in 
ways that affect minors’ bodily integrity. 
III.  INTEGRATING THE BODY OF LAW: DOCTRINAL 
AND CONCEPTUAL DIFFICULTIES 
There are two principal problems that plague any attempt to 
identify and establish the contours of a constitutional bodily integrity 
right for children against their parents. The first problem is a 
doctrinal one—identifying state action. Most interactions in which 
parents affect or supersede minors’ choices about their bodies do not 
involve state actors. Yet, it turns out that the problem of identifying 
state action in such cases is in fact quite complex. It is difficult to say 
with any clarity why and when courts identify state action in cases 
involving intrusion on minors’ bodily integrity within the family. 
The second problem is a conceptual problem that plagues any 
attempt to create or enforce a true privacy right for minors within the 
family. The creation of a privacy right inevitably—and ironically—
invites the state to police the scope and applicability of that right. 
Although this irony appears to some degree whenever an individual 
attempts to assert a privacy right against the state, thereby inviting 
the judicial arm of the state to decide on the appropriate limits of her 
privacy, this irony is particularly acute with respect to privacy claims 
within the family. Any time a child asserts a bodily integrity right 
against her parents, she is inviting the state to examine both her own 
decisionmaking and that of her parents. The child is therefore 
requesting the state to intervene in the presumptively private domain, 
as well as to judge the suitability of the reasons for her decision. State 
regulation of an individual’s reasons for a decision is, however, 
 
state was permitted, but not required, to vindicate. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 627, 637–41 
(1979) (plurality opinion). 
 196. Cf. Teitelbaum & Ellis, supra note 7, at 157 n.13 (“The Court presumably concluded 
that the existence of a statute creating a parental veto over the abortion decision constituted 
state action in Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth; otherwise the due process claim 
could never have been reached.” (citation omitted)); In re L., 632 A.2d 59, 61 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
1993) (finding that a man’s attempt to get a court order requiring a sixteen-year-old girl to 
undergo blood testing for paternity was not a case of “coercive interference with the rights of 
another” but rather of “a private party . . . seek[ing] to employ the coercive hand of the court”). 
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directly in opposition to the notion of a true privacy or 
decisionmaking autonomy right. 
A. Doctrinal Difficulties in Identifying State Action 
Though identifying state action is rarely a straightforward 
proposition,197 three state-action problems particularly plague cases 
involving minors’ right to bodily integrity. The first is the problem 
that, although there may be state action, there is often no state actor 
involved in situations in which minors’ bodily integrity right is 
implicated, at least until the moment of enforcement. This makes the 
state action more difficult to identify. The second problem is that the 
state actions impinging on minors’ bodily integrity right are often 
broad common-law or statutory rules that, on their face, do not 
appear to infringe the minors’ right; this effect is apparent only in 
their application. And third, there is the problem of identifying a 
relevant baseline for determining whether state action has occurred. 
Because of this baseline problem, even when a state actor is 
identifiable, it may be difficult to discern when the state has truly 
“acted” at all. 
1. No State Actor.  In the various doctrinal areas discussed above, 
decisions are made that affect children’s bodily integrity in various 
ways, but they generally do not involve state actors. Instead, they 
involve parents, children, and sometimes other private parties, such as 
physicians. When a state actor is in the picture—for example, a 
public-school teacher or a social worker—courts have no difficulty 
recognizing the applicability of the constitutional right to bodily 
integrity.198 By contrast, there is no apparent state action when a child 
suffers at the hands of an abusive parent, or when a parent consents 
to or withholds healthcare for a minor child, such as a tonsillectomy 
or circumcision, in a private-hospital setting.199 
 
 197. See, e.g., Christian Turner, State Action Problems, 65 FLA. L. REV. 281, 283 (2013). 
 198. See, e.g., Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 451–52 (5th Cir. 1994); T.M. ex 
rel. Cox v. Carson, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1193 (D. Wyo. 2000). 
 199. Cf. Kia P. v. McIntyre, 2 F. Supp. 2d 281, 288 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (“[I]nsofar as its 
employees provided medical care to Mora during her hospitalization, [the hospital] did not 
engage in state action that would subject it to liability under § 1983.”), aff’d, 235 F.3d 749 (2d 
Cir. 2000); Novak v. Cobb Cnty.-Kennestone Hosp. Auth., 849 F. Supp. 1559, 1578 (N.D. Ga. 
1994) (finding no state action when private physicians provided a blood transfusion to a child 
against the parents’ wishes), aff’d, 74 F.3d 1173 (11th Cir. 1996). 
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Thus, in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social 
Services,200 the Supreme Court held that no constitutional cause of 
action existed for Joshua DeShaney, a toddler who was beaten by his 
father to the point of profound brain damage, even though the county 
social-services department was aware of the situation and had failed 
to remove Joshua from the abusive environment.201 The Court’s 
opinion in DeShaney framed the issue as whether the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment entitled a child in Joshua 
DeShaney’s circumstances to the affirmative protection of the state 
against private violence.202 One might also conceptualize the issue, 
however, as one of state action. In this view, DeShaney’s 
constitutional claim failed because there was no state actor that 
appeared to be directly responsible for the violation of his bodily 
integrity. 
Yet, as the liberal perspective urges, parents’ custody and control 
of their children can fairly be said to exist by virtue of common law, 
statutory law, or a combination of the two. Thus, the state-action 
concept “does not apply comfortably to children, who are routinely 
subject to privately undertaken action authorized by state law in some 
sense.”203 Indeed, even in the case of Joshua DeShaney, the abusive 
father was entitled to maintain custody of him because of his legal 
rights as a parent; if a neighbor had sought to save Joshua by 
kidnapping him, the legal system would surely have operated to 
punish the neighbor and return Joshua to his parents. Similarly, the 
power of parents to make medical decisions for their children, with 
some exceptions, is granted by statute, common law, or both, in every 
state.204 Thus, state action is involved and the minor’s constitutional 
right to bodily integrity is potentially implicated when a parent 
authorizes a medically unnecessary procedure or refuses to authorize 
medically necessary care for a child.205 
 
 200. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
 201. Id. at 191–94. 
 202. Id. at 195–97. 
 203. Teitelbaum and Ellis, supra note 7, at 157 n.13. They note that there has arguably been 
state action in many cases by virtue of a common-law rule granting parental authority over 
children; but, they continue, “it is possible that these approaches prove too much as a general 
theory. Would it not follow that parental consent to a tonsilectomy [sic] or to enrollment in a 
private school will equally satisfy the state action requirement, and does that result seem 
consistent with the constitutional policies underlying that doctrine?” Id. at 158 n.13. 
 204. See supra notes 61–69 and accompanying text. 
 205. Moreover, the state acts in all of these situations by designating who the child’s parents 
are in the first place—that is, who has a right to custody and authority to consent to medical 
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The problem, however, is that state action is only apparent at the 
moment in which the legal entitlements of a party are enforced; once 
a police officer or juvenile-court judge enters the picture, the state 
action becomes apparent. But in many other contexts, courts 
routinely recognize state action and apply constitutional rules in civil 
suits between private parties. For example, in New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan,206 the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment 
imposed limits on the scope of a newspaper’s liability for libel in a suit 
between private parties.207 “It matters not,” the Court said, “that that 
law has been applied in a civil action and that it is common law only, 
though supplemented by statute. The test is not the form in which 
state power has been applied but, whatever the form, whether such 
power has in fact been exercised.”208 
The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Blackard v. Memphis Area 
Medical Center for Women209 is a case in point. In Blackard, parents, 
along with their minor daughter, sued a Tennessee abortion clinic for 
performing an abortion on the minor without parental consent while 
the state’s parental-consent law was temporarily enjoined.210 Given 
that the law was ultimately found constitutional and that the 
defendant clinic was not protected by the preliminary injunction 
because it was not a party to the suit, the parents of the minor argued 
that the clinic should have sought parental consent before 
proceeding.211 Yet, the Sixth Circuit held that parental consent could 
not have been required because the state had not created a judicial-
bypass procedure as required by Bellotti.212 Though the suit between 
the parties was a private suit for battery, the court held, essentially, 
that common-law enforcement of the battery right would have 
 
care. The rules of parentage are themselves legally constructed, not natural or inevitable, as 
demonstrated by the increasing prevalence of legally sanctioned families headed by same-sex 
couples. See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of 
Legitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227, 293 (2006) (“[D]efault parentage 
rules, like all legal classifications, reflect choices made by the rulemaker.”). 
 206. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 207. Id. at 265. 
 208. Id. (citation omitted). Similarly, in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), the Court 
considered whether judicial enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant among private parties 
violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 4. The Court ultimately recognized both state action 
resulting from the operation of common-law rules and also the applicability of constitutional 
norms to the dispute between private parties. Id. at 17–18. 
 209. Blackard v. Memphis Area Med. Ctr. for Women, 262 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 210. Id. at 570–71. 
 211. Id. at 570–72. 
 212. Id. at 577. 
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constituted state action that, as applied in this case, would have 
violated the minor’s abortion rights.213 
In many cases involving infringements of children’s bodily 
integrity within the family, however, children will not have access to 
courts, nor will anyone other than the parents be able to raise their 
children’s right to bodily integrity.214 The state action is thus obscured, 
leading courts to view the problem as one of individuals seeking 
protection against intrusions by “private actors” or state “inaction,” 
when in fact, the state action is present in state-created rules and 
entitlements.215 Indeed, the rule that prevents minors from accessing 
courts independently is, itself, a legal rule and hence a form of state 
action, rather than a natural or inevitable state of affairs. 
A state-court case involving a minor’s reproductive rights further 
demonstrates this difficulty. In Powers v. Floyd,216 the Texas Court of 
Appeals considered whether a doctor who performed an abortion on 
a sixteen-year-old minor in 1974 without that minor’s permission, but 
with her mother’s permission, could be held liable for failing to obtain 
proper informed consent.217 The court decided that, as a matter of 
state statutory law, the doctor was under no duty to obtain the 
minor’s informed consent to the procedure because state law clearly 
granted authority over the minor’s medical treatment to the parent.218 
At the same time, although the court acknowledged that the U.S. 
Supreme Court had recognized a right of mature minors to make 
their own abortion decisions after the abortion at issue had occurred, 
 
 213. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 650–51 (1979) (plurality opinion). 
 214. Cf. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 15–16 (2004) (noting that even 
a parent does not always have the authority to raise the rights of his child in a lawsuit, 
particularly when the parent’s and child’s interests conflict), abrogated by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. 
Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014). An exception is those cases in which a 
parent seeks to withhold medically necessary care. If a physician or hospital is alerted to the 
denial of care—for example, because the child has been taken to a doctor but the parent refuses 
to proceed with a recommended course of treatment—the hospital or department of social 
services will sometimes invoke the court’s jurisdiction, seeking an order allowing the treatment 
to take place over the parents’ objections. See, e.g., In re Willmann, 493 N.E.2d 1380, 1384 
(1986). In addition, courts are often called upon to adjudicate minors’ rights when parents 
disagree, or when parents may face a conflict of interest (such as sibling organ donation). In 
such cases, however, the courts generally do not perceive the case as implicating constitutional 
bodily integrity rights, likely because of the two other state-action problems discussed below. 
 215. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 204 (1989) (Brennan, 
J., dissenting). 
 216. Powers v. Floyd, 904 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995). 
 217. Id. at 714. The doctor performed the abortion without telling the minor that she was 
pregnant or that the pregnancy was being terminated. Id. at 714–15. 
 218. Id. at 716–18. 
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it noted that those Supreme Court decisions “do not attempt to 
impose a legal duty upon a physician.”219 Thus, as the court noted in 
passing, there would be no constitutional claim because “the 
constitution does not provide or create a right against a private actor 
absent state action.”220 It is not clear, however, why the Texas 
common law, statutes, and judicial enforcement thereof, would not 
constitute sufficient state action to implicate the minor’s 
constitutional right in this scenario, and therefore to require 
application of constitutional norms. Powers thus demonstrates the 
difficulty of identifying state action when no state actor is present. 
2. Facially Neutral Rules.  A second state-action problem 
inherent in cases dealing with minors’ bodily integrity right is that the 
relevant state action is usually in the form of broad, facially neutral 
rules, such as those that give parents the authority to make medical 
decisions for minor children, rather than rules that specifically 
reference particular procedures that parents can authorize for minors, 
such as laws requiring parental consent for abortion. When a law 
broadly delegates authority over medical decisionmaking for children 
or otherwise grants parents sweeping control over their children, it 
makes it possible for a parent to violate a child’s bodily integrity. It 
does not, however, mandate such a result in every case as parents may 
exercise their authority in a constitutional manner in the vast majority 
of cases. As a result, the infringement on minors’ bodily integrity 
results exclusively from particular applications of those facially 
neutral rules. There may be nothing constitutionally objectionable, 
for example, in the general common-law presumption or statutory 
rule that parents have the authority to make medical decisions for 
their minor children. Indeed, parents’ constitutional rights might even 
require such a presumption in favor of them as above all other 
decision-makers.221 If that parental authority is used to prevent a 
minor from obtaining an abortion that is in her best interests or to 
impose unnecessary and unwanted cosmetic surgery on the minor, 
however, the bodily integrity right is implicated. 
 
 219. Id. at 716. 
 220. Id. (citing Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974)). The court also 
noted that the minor abortion cases post-dated the abortion in the case at hand. Id. 
 221. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000) (“[T]here is a presumption that fit 
parents act in the best interests of their children.”). 
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This problem calls to mind Shelley v. Kraemer,222 which involved 
the constitutionality of a court enforcing a private contract—
specifically, a racially restrictive covenant. Although the state had 
clearly acted in Shelley through its enforcement of common-law 
contract rules, the more difficult problem was determining whether 
the state action was the source of the constitutional violation, or 
whether the violation could be attributed only to a private actor.223 As 
numerous commentators have noted, Shelley’s attribution of private 
discrimination to courts enforcing private agreements pursuant to 
neutral-contract principles is potentially so expansive as to undermine 
any line between state-sponsored discrimination, which is 
unconstitutional, and private discrimination, which is not.224 For this 
reason, Shelley’s rationale has rarely, if ever, been applied in 
subsequent cases.225  
Thus, in the case of children’s right to bodily integrity, it is 
sometimes obvious that state action is present, but it is not clear 
whether the state action itself is violative of the child’s right. For 
example, when a parent seeks to withhold medical care from a child, 
pursuant to the parent’s general legal right to make medical decisions 
for his or her children, courts may become involved at the behest of 
hospitals or physicians who wish to impose care. In such cases, courts 
do not generally address whether the child’s constitutional right to 
bodily integrity would be violated by a court order permitting the 
parent to withhold care.226 Instead, such cases are decided based on 
neutral principles of law such as a determination of the harm to the 
child and whether specific abuse or neglect statutes would be 
violated.227 Although the state is clearly acting in such cases when it 
 
 222. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
 223. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE, LOUIS M. SEIDMAN, CASS R. SUNSTEIN & MARK V. 
TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1522 (4th ed. 2001) (articulating this interpretation of 
Shelley); Mark D. Rosen, Was Shelley v. Kraemer Incorrectly Decided? Some New Answers, 95 
CALIF. L. REV. 451, 458 (2007). 
 224. Rosen, supra note 223, at 459. 
 225. Id. at 458. 
 226. My research has not turned up any cases in which the minor’s constitutional right to 
bodily integrity was referenced in connection with a parent’s request to withhold medical care. 
 227. Indeed, in a related context, Professor James Dwyer has gone so far as to argue—in 
response to Professor Eugene Volokh’s claim that child-custody conditions on parental speech 
are subject to First Amendment constraints—that constitutional rights are simply not relevant 
to child-custody determinations, in which the courts are exercising their parens patriae power 
rather than their police power. James G. Dwyer, Parents’ Self Determination and Children’s 
Custody: A New Analytical Framework for State Structuring of Children’s Family Life, 54 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 79, 125–26 (2012). But see Eugene Volokh, Parent-Child Speech and Child Custody 
HILL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/25/2015  12:23 PM 
2015] BODILY INTEGRITY 1343 
approves or disapproves the parent’s decision, courts do not take the 
minor’s constitutional rights into account because the parent’s 
discretionary actions, taken pursuant to a general grant of legal 
authority, cannot easily be imputed to the state. 
3. Discerning “Action.”  Finally, discerning a constitutional right 
of minors to bodily integrity invokes the unique problem of 
determining when the state has, in fact, acted. The problem is one of 
discerning the baseline against which state action, or intervention, is 
to be judged. This problem arises uniquely when one person asserts 
rights over another. When the individual rights of competent adults 
are involved, the baseline is clear—adults are assumed to have the 
liberty to engage in a particular action, and state action occurs 
whenever the government interferes with that liberty. Within the 
parent-child relationship, however, the baseline assumption is not 
always clear. As explained above, courts are likely to identify state 
action based on whether they are starting from a parentalist or liberal 
view of the family. From the liberal perspective, the state intervenes 
when it grants parents authority over minors’ bodies; from the 
parentalist perspective, it acts when it intervenes to take away 
parental authority. 
The baseline problem is apparent in cases involving state laws 
that grant minors access to contraceptives.228 In one case, the New 
York Appellate Division found a public-school condom-distribution 
program to be coercive and violative of parental rights because 
“parents [we]re being compelled by State authority to send their 
children into an environment where they [were] permitted, even 
encouraged, to obtain a contraceptive device, which the parents 
disfavor as a matter of private belief.”229 In contrast to the abortion 
cases, the court’s baseline assumption appeared to be one of parental 
control over minors’ access to contraception. Moreover, the court 
discerned governmental coercion from the fact that children were 
required by law to attend school where they had access to the 
 
Speech Restrictions, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 631, 649–56 (2006) (arguing that the First Amendment is 
implicated not only when courts issue orders restricting parents’ speech, but also when courts 
make custody or visitation decisions based on such speech). 
 228. See, e.g., Parents United for Better Sch., Inc. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 148 
F.3d 260, 277 (3d Cir. 1998); Doe v. Irwin, 615 F.2d 1162, 1168 (6th Cir. 1980); Curtis v. Sch. 
Comm., 652 N.E.2d 580, 584–89 (Mass. 1995); Decker v. Carroll Acad., No. 02A01-9709-CV-
00242, 1999 WL 332705, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 26, 1999). 
 229. Alfonso v. Fernandez, 606 N.Y.S.2d. 259, 265 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993). 
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program.230 Yet in other cases involving public-school condom-
distribution programs, a number of courts found that there was no 
governmental coercion sufficient to raise a constitutional issue with 
respect to the parents’ family-privacy or free-exercise rights.231 In 
those cases, the courts rejected the argument that compulsory 
education constitutes governmental coercion, again raising the issue 
of baselines: a school-sponsored condom-distribution program seems 
coercive only if compulsory education laws are themselves seen as 
coercive, rather than as part of the status quo.232 
A similar confusion also plagues the abortion cases. In Hodgson 
v. Minnesota,233 a majority of the Supreme Court upheld a parental-
notification requirement for minors seeking abortions.234 In dissent, 
Justice Marshall noted that the majority assumed the intrusion on the 
minors’ right—which here provided the state action forming the basis 
of the minors’ constitutional claims—was justified by the need to 
protect family privacy.235 But, Marshall insisted, the family-privacy 
right was a right “against state interference with family matters,” 
whereas the notification requirement effected “governmental 
intrusion into family interactions.”236 Thus, Hodgson raises the 
question as to whether the state intrudes into the family when it 
permits minors to access abortions without parental notification, or 
whether the state intrudes into the family when it forces minors to 
notify their parents. 
 
 230. Id. at 265–66. 
 231. See Parents United, 148 F.3d at 277; Doe, 615 F.2d at 1168; Curtis, 652 N.E.2d at 584–89 
(finding that a school condom-availability program “lack[ed] any degree of coercion or 
compulsion in violation of the plaintiffs’ parental liberties, or their familial privacy”); Decker, 
1999 WL 332705, at *10. 
 232. Parents United, 148 F.3d at 276–77 (noting the argument regarding compulsory 
education, but essentially ignoring it because the condom program had a parental “opt-out”); 
Curtis, 652 N.E.2d at 586–87 (noting the compulsory education argument and the lack of an opt-
out, but rejecting the notion that governmental coercion was therefore present). 
 233. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990). 
 234. Id. at 461 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Hodgson involved a two-parent notification law 
that included no bypass mechanism for the minor, but also stated that a bypass mechanism 
would be created if the law were held unconstitutional without it. Id. at 426–27. Four Justices 
felt that the notification requirement was constitutional, with or without a bypass, and four 
Justices felt that it was unconstitutional, with or without a bypass. Only Justice O’Connor 
thought the requirement was unconstitutional without the bypass and constitutional with it, so 
she provided the deciding vote on both counts. 
 235. Id. at 483–84 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Pierce v. 
Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) and Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)). 
 236. Id. at 471 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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Given the fundamental conflict between the liberal and 
parentalist understandings of the family, it is not surprising that 
courts cannot decide when the state has acted—that is, whether state 
intervention consists in granting or denying parental authority over 
children’s bodies. Indeed, numerous commentators have 
acknowledged the deep-seated confusion at the heart of the state-
action concept.237 For example, the notion that nonintervention 
equates perfectly with the absence of state action has been roundly 
criticized.238 Professor Frances Olsen has argued that the terms 
“intervention” and “nonintervention” are incoherent in the family 
context, pointing out that political choices are inevitable, even when 
the government purports only to enforce the status quo rather than 
actively intervene.239 Olsen argues that “[t]he state constantly defines 
and redefines the family and adjusts and readjusts family roles” and is 
always empowering or disempowering the weaker or stronger 
members of a family depending on the rules it chooses to enforce or 
decline to enforce.240 Thus, for example, Olsen notes that laws may 
penalize those who take children away from the custody of their 
parents, “[y]et the state is not accused of intervening in the family 
when it forces children to live with their parents or when it prohibits 
doctors from treating minors without the parents’ knowledge and 
approval.”241 
Olsen’s critique is related to the classical feminist critique of the 
public–private distinction, which holds that the state-action 
requirement for vindicating rights to equality and bodily integrity 
systematically undermines women’s claims to the same.242 As 
Professor Tracy Higgins explains the critique, “the principal threat to 
women’s liberty and equality comes not from public power but from 
private power.”243 Yet, 
 
 237. For a classic example, see Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on 
Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1296, 1302 (1982). 
 238. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE 
AND LAW 42 (1987); Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 835, 835 (1985). 
 239. Olsen, supra note 238, at 835. 
 240. Id. at 842. 
 241. Id. at 853. 
 242. See Tracy E. Higgins, Reviving the Public/Private Distinction in Feminist Theorizing, 75 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 847, 858–59 (2000) (“[A] meaningful right to freedom, bodily integrity, and 
security for women must include effective remedies against private violence.”). 
 243. Id. at 859. 
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a state’s systematic failure to respond to abuses of private power will 
rarely, if ever, implicate constitutional concerns. Moreover, because 
state action is constitutionally relevant while private action is not, 
state efforts to intervene in the existing balance of power in the 
private sphere are viewed as unconstitutional violations of the rights 
of the powerful rather than an effort to balance or regulate 
conflicting rights.244 
The distinction between intervention and nonintervention, or action 
and inaction, thus appears to be an arbitrary preference for the status 
quo—one that privileges those who possess greater physical, financial, 
or social power—rather than a meaningful constitutional distinction. 
This problem is particularly acute in the case of children because 
of their inherent dependency. As the DeShaney Court confirmed, the 
Constitution provides only negative rights to government 
noninterference, rather than affirmative rights to “certain minimal 
levels of safety and security.”245 Yet for children, rights to safety and 
protection are at least as important as freedom from governmental 
intrusion in their lives. Being in a position of unique dependency, 
children rely on the government and others for the meaningful 
exercise of their rights, much like prisoners and active-duty members 
of the military.246 Although it may be true that adults have only a 
bodily integrity right against unwanted, government-imposed physical 
intrusion, it is not clear why children’s constitutional right to bodily 
integrity should include no more than a mere right against 
government intervention or governmental interference with access to 
treatment. 
B. Theoretical Difficulties in Identifying State Action 
The doctrinal difficulties discussed above are rooted in 
theoretical problems with the very concept of minors’ bodily integrity 
rights, particularly to the extent that the right is understood as a 
privacy right against harmful government intrusion. This Part 
therefore seeks to explain the doctrinal dilemma of state action. The 
theoretical difficulties underlying state action take two forms. First is 
 
 244. Id. at 859–60 (citing MACKINNON, supra note 238, at 42). 
 245. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989). 
 246. The idea that children have certain rights by virtue of their dependency is captured by 
Professor Joel Feinberg’s concept of “[d]ependency-rights.” Joel Feinberg, The Child’s Right to 
an Open Future, in WHOSE CHILD? CHILDREN’S RIGHTS, PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND STATE 
POWER 124, 125 (William Aiken & Hugh LaFollette eds., 1980). 
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the “paradox of privacy,” according to which the creation of privacy 
rights actually leads to greater, rather than lesser, scrutiny of the 
rightsholder’s choices.247 Second is the conundrum of separating state 
action from private action in the family context, where the state’s 
parens patriae role and duties are often conflated with the roles and 
responsibilities of the parents. These difficulties are usefully 
elucidated by Foucault’s theory of governmental power, which is 
described in detail below. Foucault helpfully demonstrates the 
pervasiveness of state power and its implications. 
The very existence of a constitutional privacy right seems to 
preclude a genuine realm of nonintervention. The moment courts 
decide to carve out a domain for family or children’s privacy rights, 
they must begin to decide how and when this right may be exercised 
and its limits. This analysis generally takes the form of an intrusive 
inquiry into the reasoning and decisionmaking processes. The 
predominant focus on private reasons for taking action affecting the 
child’s body—whether the reasons of the parent or those of the 
child—conflicts with the very notion of a privacy right. It intrudes 
upon the decision in a way that is diametrically opposed to any 
meaningful understanding of privacy.248 
In a related context, Professor Carol Sanger has argued that 
meaningful reproductive choice means exercising control not only 
over the abortion decision itself, but also “over the method and 
process by which [the] abortion decision is reached.”249 Using 
analogies to other protected rights, such as religious freedom, in 
which the state is generally viewed as powerless to influence the 
individual’s decision process, Sanger explains, “[I]f a choice is 
protected because of the profound significance it bears to the 
meaning of a person’s life, then the part of life devoted to the 
choosing—the thinking it through—has got to be protected as well.”250 
Of course, there are numerous domains in which the state can be 
understood to regulate individuals’ private reasons for doing 
something: for example, hate-crime laws aggravate penalties if crimes 
 
 247. Cf. David D. Meyer, The Paradox of Family Privacy, 53 VAND. L. REV. 527, 529–30 
(2000) (observing the same phenomenon with respect to familial privacy rights). 
 248. Cf. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, What Is Really Wrong with Compelled Association, 99 
NW. U. L. REV. 839, 845 (2005) (defending the constitutional value of the freedom to think and 
reason in the absence of governmentally compelled speech or associations). 
 249. Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to a Protected 
Choice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 351, 358 (2008). 
 250. Id. at 391. 
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are committed for certain reasons But those areas in which state 
regulation is based on an individual’s reasons for acting are not areas 
that are protected by an individual right to privacy. 
In addition, state action is made more complex by the troubling 
elision of roles that occurs when the state evaluates private reasons in 
this manner. The state-court judge may appear to take on the role of 
the parent; indeed, some have been unable to resist actively assuming 
that role.251 For example, in one judicial-bypass case, a judge stated, 
“‘Let me just say, I’m very concerned about this young lady’s welfare. 
Like counsel, I’m a mother.’”252 The functions of discipline and 
punishment inherent in many of the ways in which minors’ bodies are 
regulated—particularly with respect to judicial-bypass hearings and 
corporal punishment—tend to conflate the role of the state and the 
role of the parent. Thus, as the quote above indicates, judges ruling 
on bypass petitions sometimes use the hearing as an opportunity to 
chastise the petitioner, exercising a quasi-parental role. Moreover, 
much as the state is entitled to the legitimate use of violence for 
punishing wrongdoing, parental discipline is legally legitimate when it 
is for the purpose of punishment or otherwise in the interest of 
shaping the child into a better and more productive citizen.253 
To make sense of these theoretical difficulties, it is helpful to 
draw on the writings of the philosopher and historian Michel 
Foucault. One of Foucault’s most persistent concerns is with the 
meaning and function of power.254 Foucault’s critical examination of 
power in all of its manifestations does not focus specifically on law, on 
the family, or on liberalism.255 Nonetheless, Foucault’s theory of 
power and its effects may be understood as a challenge to liberalism’s 
attempted reconciliation of parental prerogatives and democratic 
values with respect to children. 
 
 251. Sanger, supra note 131, at 451. 
 252. Id. (quoting Ex parte Anonymous, 803 So. 2d 542, 561 (Ala. 2001)). 
 253. Cf. Dailey, supra note 103, at 1005 (discussing the “public” role of families in shaping 
future citizens). 
 254. See, e.g., Michel Foucault, The Subject and Power, 8 CRITICAL INQUIRY 777, 778 (1982) 
(observing that he became “quite involved with the question of power” as a means of studying 
the subject, which he identified as “the general theme of [his] research”). 
 255. Note that although Foucault engaged in an extended critique of the economic theory of 
“American neo-liberalism” embodied most visibly by the economist Gary Becker, he did not 
present his own work as a critique of American liberal political theory per se; rather, I am 
inferring this critique from a juxtaposition of Foucault’s work with that of John Rawls (who was 
a contemporary of Foucault’s) and others such as Gutmann, who came later. See generally 
MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF BIOPOLITICS 239–66 (Graham Burchell trans., 2008). 
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Foucault contends that in modern society, social power is not 
simply a thing wielded by the state; it is itself an effect that may be 
manifested in many different forms, including in private 
relationships.256 Thus, according to Foucault, state power is 
everywhere.257 Unlike medieval society, in which power was 
concentrated in the sovereign, modern society manifests social power 
through multiple centers, particularly through the discourse that 
organizes, categorizes, and explains our experiences.258 In The History 
of Sexuality, for example, Foucault argues that the Victorian Era, 
supposedly characterized by a prudish disdain for speaking about 
sexuality, was actually an era in which particular kinds of discourse 
about sex—medical, psychological, moral, and so on—proliferated as 
a way of managing and controlling sex and sexuality.259 
The case law that creates and delimits children’s privacy rights 
results in a similar proliferation of discourse. Although superficially 
aimed at liberating children and granting them autonomy over their 
bodies, this case law in fact operates as a means to further manage 
and control both children’s choices and those of their parents. This 
fact is evidenced by the judicial preoccupation with children’s and 
parents’ reasoning.260 In addition, every recognition of a right is at the 
same time an invitation for state intervention, as courts themselves 
must now determine the scope of the right. For example, although 
appearing to grant minors autonomy in reproductive decisionmaking, 
the minor abortion cases in fact simply subject them to judicial, rather 
than parental control. 
Thus, according to Foucault, power in modern society is both 
expansive and diffuse: “Nobody knows this knowledge; no one wields 
this power.”261 Though power is sometimes coercive in form, acting 
directly on individuals’ bodies, it also functions “by normalization, 
not by punishment but by control, [by] methods that are employed on 
 
 256. MICHEL FOUCAULT, 1 THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 93–94 (Robert Hurley trans., 
1988). 
 257. Id. at 93. 
 258. Id. at 100–02. 
 259. See id. at 33–34 (“Sex was driven out of hiding and constrained to lead a discursive 
existence.”). 
 260. See, e.g., Baird v. Attorney Gen., 360 N.E.2d 288, 292–93 (Mass. 1977) (stating that a 
minor’s parents may legally withhold consent to an abortion for some reasons but not others); 
Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972) (carefully evaluating the moral soundness 
of the parents’ reasons for authorizing kidney donation by a minor child). 
 261. Ian Hacking, The Archaeology of Foucault, in FOUCAULT: A CRITICAL READER 27, 28 
(David Couzens Hoy ed., 1986). 
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all levels and in forms that go beyond the state and its apparatus.”262 
Foucault contends that scientific discourse about sex creates a domain 
of the normal, appropriate, and average that is demarcated from the 
pathological, and that this demarcation is both an instance of and an 
opportunity for the exercise of power.263 
As this Article demonstrates, legal discourse is similarly 
preoccupied with individual decisions and how they compare to 
community norms.264 In Marriage of Boldt, discussed above, the court 
explicitly referenced social norms in upholding a parent’s decision to 
circumcise his twelve-year-old son for religious reasons.265 Similarly, 
state courts consider parents’ reasons for inflicting physical pain on 
their children when deciding whether to label the conduct as abuse or 
as a legitimate form of discipline. The conduct, of course, is also 
reviewed for “excessiveness” and judged by other similarly 
amorphous norms that call for decisionmakers to apply the judges’ 
own, or society’s, sense of what is normal and acceptable conduct.266 
The concept of legitimate discipline, in particular, links the case law 
on children’s bodily integrity to Foucault’s work on social power.267 
Moreover, though social power is often exercised in private 
settings, Foucault conceptualizes that power as nonetheless tied to the 
state.268 The private power is “governmentalized” because of the way 
its exercise is influenced by state-created norms and rules: 
It is certain that in contemporary societies the state is not simply one 
of the forms or specific situations of the exercise of power—even if it 
is the most important—but that in a certain way all other forms of 
power relation must refer to it. But this is not because they are 
derived from it; it is rather because power relations have come more 
 
 262. FOUCAULT, supra note 256, at 89. Dean Martha Minow has stated, “Power is at its 
peak when it is least visible, when it shapes preferences, arranges agendas, and excludes serious 
challenges from discussion or even imagination.” Martha Minow, The Supreme Court: 1986 
Term—Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 68 (1987). I am grateful to 
Professor Susan Frelich Appleton for bringing this quote to my attention. 
 263. FOUCAULT, supra note 256, at 33–34. 
 264. See supra notes 138 and 148 and accompanying text. 
 265. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
 266. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 267. David Couzens Hoy, Introduction to FOUCAULT: A CRITICAL READER, supra note 
261, at 1, 13. Social power is closely linked to the concept of “discipline” in two senses. First, the 
term “discipline” implies exercising control, and thus power, in the way a parent or a state 
disciplines individuals. Second, social power is bound up with academic disciplines, in that 
disciplines are the mechanisms by which knowledge is acquired and organized. Id. 
 268. Foucault, supra note 254, at 793. 
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and more under state control . . . . [O]ne could say that power 
relations have been progressively governmentalized, that is to say, 
elaborated, rationalized, and centralized in the form of, or under the 
auspices of, state institutions.269 
Examples of this decentralized state power include obvious tentacles 
of the state such as prisons, schools, the public-welfare system, and 
public-health programs, as well as less obvious agents of sovereign 
power like private charities and the medical-scientific establishment, 
as well as the family itself.270 Foucault therefore envisions state power 
as permeating and shaping all aspects of human experience; it is 
nearly (but not entirely) inescapable.271 All of these institutions, 
though manifesting state power, operate to a large degree 
independently of any centralized authority. 
Furthermore, although the quintessential image of sovereign 
power may be that of the government acting upon individuals’ 
bodies—for example, by arresting or imprisoning them—the real 
object of the modern disciplining state, according to Foucault, is 
control over individuals’ minds and souls.272 The state disciplines in 
many instances through internalized norms and standards, rather than 
through brute force. Moreover, one of the primary modes through 
which power performs these operations is a linguistic one—namely 
“discourse.”273 “[I]t is in discourse that power and knowledge are 
joined together. . . . Discourse transmits and produces power; it 
reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile 
and makes it possible to thwart it.”274 Legal discourse is one such 
 
 269. Id. 
 270. See, e.g., id. at 784 (referring to “pastoral power” exerted by public arms such as the 
police as well as “private ventures, welfare societies, benefactors, and generally by 
philanthropists” in addition to “the family” and “complex structures such as medicine”). 
 271. Indeed, some commentators criticize Foucault for “describ[ing] power as so pervasive 
and irresistible as to make resistance seem futile”; Professor David Hoy suggests, however, that 
Foucault believed modern society had not yet been completely “normalized,” and that he wrote 
precisely in the hope of staving off such complete normalization. Hoy, supra note 267, at 13–14. 
 272. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 10–11 
(Alan Sheridan trans., 1977) (describing a “‘non-corporal’ penalty” in which “[t]he body . . . 
serves as an instrument or intermediary”); id. at 17 (noting that in the modern penal system, 
“the ‘crimes’ and ‘offences’ on which judgement [sic] is passed are juridical objects defined by 
the code, but judgement [sic] is also passed on the passions, instincts, anomalies, infirmities, 
maladjustments, effects of environment or heredity”). 
 273. See, e.g., FOUCAULT, supra note 256, at 100–01. 
 274. Id. 
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discourse; other normalizing discourses include those practiced in the 
medical, scientific, psychological, and public-health disciplines.  
Foucault’s emphasis on normalization and on controlling minds 
rather than bodies helps to explain the “paradox of privacy,” by 
which a proliferation of privacy rights can coexist with ever-increasing 
state intrusion in individuals’ decisionmaking processes. The ultimate 
aim and inevitable result of state power is to control the mental 
processes—the individual’s reasoning—rather than the underlying 
conduct. The existence of a privacy right therefore functions as a 
welcome invitation for courts to scrutinize those processes, while 
simultaneously protecting certain private conduct from state 
regulation. 
Importantly, however, disciplinary power is often “positive” in 
the sense that its goal is not to repress, but to improve and extend the 
lives of individuals, to make them productive citizens. Foucault claims 
that such regulation in the interest of societal good and social mores is 
simply a newer form of power, but still exercised, as always, over 
human bodies.275 Foucault describes public-health regulation and 
related surveillance and management of health data as a form of 
“biopower”—power that is exercised on the level of the population as 
a whole and in the interests of society as a whole.276 
Indeed, according to Foucault, it is precisely in the regulation of 
the body that the disciplinary and regulatory mechanisms tend to 
overlap.277 Foucault describes how “[c]irculat[ing] between the two” 
poles of individual discipline and population-level biopolitics “is the 
norm.”278 Social norms become tools of both individual discipline and 
regularization of the population.279 
To the extent the values imposed by liberalism create a certain 
harmony of ideals between the family and the broader democratic 
society, that harmony is a reflection of the way in which modern state 
power infiltrates all dimensions of human life, or in Foucault’s words, 
“cover[s] the whole surface that lies between the organic and the 
biological, between body and population.”280 Moreover, where minors 
 
 275. MICHEL FOUCAULT, “SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED”: LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE 
DE FRANCE, 1975–76, at 242 (Mauro Bertani & Alessandro Fontana eds., David Macey trans., 
1977). 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. at 250–51. 
 278. Id. at 253. 
 279. Id.  
 280. Id.  
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have been granted autonomy rights by courts to serve particular 
public-health goals, those rights may also be understood as an 
instance of this phenomenon. 
One example of how social norms can both shape and construct 
the understanding of children’s bodies and bodily integrity, revealing 
an exercise of power at the intersection of medical, familial, and 
social discourses, is in the context of defining child abuse.281 
Documenting the fluctuation of the concept of child abuse over time, 
philosopher and historian of science Ian Hacking observes that child 
abuse is a “normalizing concept.”282 Child abuse is defined and 
understood “in a framework of normalcy and pathology,” but at the 
same time, the nature of the “normal” is not fixed.283 Rather, the 
normal is both a descriptive and prescriptive concept—“what is 
unusual becomes abnormal, and what is abnormal becomes wrong.”284 
Hacking uses the example of a commentator who suggests that it is 
abusive to allow children to sleep with their parents past the stage of 
infancy.285 Hacking notes that this practice was once commonplace 
and only subsided when a large number of families could afford 
homes large enough that children could have separate rooms from 
their parents.286 The concept of child abuse thus invokes a norm at the 
intersection of the individual and the broader society: what is 
“normal” in the sense of being common within a society becomes 
“normal” in the sense of appropriate and acceptable for the 
individual.287 This normalizing process is the modern manifestation of 
social power. 
The Foucauldian perspective suggests that both the elision of 
roles and the attention to private reasoning are functions of the 
omnipresence of state power in modern society, and they are united 
 
 281. Hacking, supra note 163, at 285–88. 
 282. Id. at 286. 
 283. Id. at 287. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. The practice of cosleeping has become more common again, often due to the 
parents’ parenting philosophy or the simple need to get some sleep. See, e.g., Donald G. McNeil 
Jr., More Infants Are Sleeping with Their Parents, and a Debate Ensues, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 
2011, at A9 (noting that the percent of infants who shared beds with parents more than doubled 
from 1993 to 2000). 
 287. The normalizing force of defining abuse provides one explanation for why those who 
are already marginal within society—racially, socioeconomically, and so on—may be more 
likely to be labeled as abusers. See generally Bridges, supra note 96, at 117 (arguing that indigent 
women and families lack the presumption of privacy and are more subject to “public” scrutiny). 
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by the concept of “discipline.” The law’s focus on private deliberation 
and reasoning is entirely expected if one understands the object of 
social power to be the “soul” rather than the body and the means by 
which that power is exercised to be the social norm. Indeed, Foucault 
claims that social norms operate to unite the disciplinary and the 
regulatory power—acting both at the level of the individual, who 
internalizes the norms, and the state, which enforces them.288 
As exemplified by the term parens patriae, the concept of 
discipline itself unites parent and state in the goal of protecting 
children but also the goal of molding them into model citizens. The 
term parens patriae literally translates as “parent of his or her 
country,” but it means that the state acts as parent in certain 
situations.289 The identification of the parent with the state suggests 
that state power permeates the family as the family itself becomes 
governmentalized. Through the law’s management of children’s 
bodies within the family, family relations are studied, surveilled, and 
normalized. Some parents’ punishment is deemed legitimate, and 
others’ is not; some minors’ reasons for avoiding childbirth are strong 
enough, whereas others are not. Children’s healthcare is regulated in 
the interest of the greater good in that they receive some autonomy 
rights only to the extent that this autonomy serves the interests of 
public health—for example, through exceptions to parental-consent 
requirements for minors seeking access to testing and treatment for 
sexually transmitted diseases.290 
Moreover, the elision of parental and governmental roles, 
brought about in part by the state’s regulation of the reasoning 
behind private decisionmaking with respect to children’s bodies, 
demonstrates the way in which state power permeates the family, 
imposing its power to normalize and standardize. The state acts as 
parent in exercising its parens patriae power. The metaphor becomes 
even more concrete when a judge steps into the parent’s role in a 
judicial-bypass hearing, or when the court stands in for community 
standards in examining the parents’ motivation for seeking to 
 
 288. FOUCAULT, supra note 275, at 253. 
 289. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1221 (9th ed. 2009). 
 290. See, e.g., Elizabeth Scott & Clare Huntington, Children’s Health in a Legal Framework 
2 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 14-418), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2503685 (arguing that “the state 
intervenes to promote children’s health only in response to compelling social welfare needs such 
as reducing teenage pregnancy, juvenile crime, and communicable diseases,” or in response to 
abusive parents). 
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authorize an organ donation from one sibling to another.291 Yet the 
parent also stands in for the state, disciplining the child in the interest 
of creating better citizens—and only when the discipline is for reasons 
the state considers legitimate. The state acts, in a sense, as a 
“‘civilizing mechanism[] . . . , reminding people subjectively of the 
locus of power’”292 and “satisfy[ing] the needs of social order.”293 At 
the same time, “relations of power” permeate the parent-child 
relationship, and it seems arbitrary to attribute any one exercise of 
power to the state.294 
Foucault’s theory suggests a reason why the legal discourse of 
privacy within the family, in conjunction with the emergence of the 
legal discourse of children’s rights, likely only increases the power of 
the state rather than creating a true zone of privacy or empowerment 
for minors. Once both children and parents are understood as rights-
holders, opportunities for adjudication of their respective rights 
proliferate.295 Eventually, the law occupies all available space within 
the parent-child relationship, as every decision with respect to 
children’s bodies carries possible implications for the minor’s right to 
bodily integrity. Moreover, the diffuse but omnipresent role of the 
state—which sets the background rules of parental custody and 
control over medical decisionmaking—creates not just legal but also 
potentially constitutional implications for every such choice by parent 
or child. 
IV.  REIMAGINING STATE ACTION AND CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 
The doctrinal and theoretical incoherence of state action raises 
unique problems for the partially constitutionalized right of children 
to bodily integrity. The failure of courts to recognize and address 
these problems directly accounts for their failure to recognize a 
consistent and meaningful right of minors to bodily integrity. This 
Section therefore suggests a partial way out of the state-action 
problem by means of a more careful understanding of state power. 
 
 291. See supra notes 143–47 and accompanying text. 
 292. Sanger, supra note 131, at 470 (quoting NATALIE SEMON DAVIS, FICTION IN THE 
ARCHIVE: PARDON TALES & THEIR TELLERS IN SIXTEENTH-CENTURY FRANCE (1987)). 
 293. Id. at 471. 
 294. Foucault, supra note 254, at 793. 
 295. The common law itself fits within Foucault’s understanding of diffuse and decentralized 
state power that acts within private as well as public domains.  
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The first step in reimagining children’s constitutional right to 
bodily integrity is to consistently recognize the right across all 
doctrinal areas, including reproductive healthcare, end-of-life care, 
routine medical decisionmaking, nontherapeutic interventions, and 
corporal punishment. All of these domains implicate the bodily 
integrity right. So long as state action can be identified, there is no 
reason for applying constitutional doctrine to one kind of dispute but 
not the others. 
The second step is to establish the content of the constitutional 
right to bodily integrity for children. As argued above, the content of 
that right is implicit in both the common-law recognition of the state’s 
authority to intervene in the family on behalf of children and in the 
minor abortion cases. For younger minors, the right takes the form of 
a right to bodily security or protection—broadly, a right to have their 
best interests protected by the state against parents who fail to do so. 
For older, mature minors, the right becomes primarily an autonomy 
right to make their own decisions about their bodies when, and to the 
extent that, they are capable of doing so. 
Foucault’s theory of power—which appears to be particularly 
applicable in the context of children’s right to bodily integrity—
further suggests the arbitrariness of the state-action line drawn by 
cases such as DeShaney. It demonstrates that state power permeates 
and structures the family relationship. The third step in reconceiving 
children’s right to bodily integrity is thus to consider the state as 
acting in some sense whenever parents act on their children’s bodies 
without danger of legal sanction. If the state is acting as a parent, and 
the parent is acting as agent of the state, then it is not particularly 
meaningful to consider some violations as purely private and others 
as perpetrated by public actors. Under this new understanding of 
state action, in contrast to existing doctrine, every parental violation 
of a child’s bodily integrity would become a potential constitutional 
violation, chargeable to the state. The problems of identifying state 
actors and state action would thus fall away in most cases. 
Yet, the problems with this scenario are obvious. Many teenagers 
would, no doubt, be inclined to make a federal case—literally!—out 
of every prohibited tattoo, every detention by grounding, every 
rhinoplasty denied. Though in some sense it is accurate that a parent 
is drawing on the authority of the state when she controls her child’s 
body in these ways, there is a danger that the scope of judicial 
intervention in family disputes would become overwhelming and 
ultimately harmful, both to families and to the courts. 
HILL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/25/2015  12:23 PM 
2015] BODILY INTEGRITY 1357 
At the same time, it may be possible to retain Foucault’s 
understanding of state power while avoiding the problem of courts 
micromanaging family decisionmaking. This could be accomplished 
by providing a degree of substantive parental discretion or privacy 
within the family. Constitutional doctrine could and should recognize 
that parental decisions about children’s bodies contain a 
constitutional dimension, without radically changing the existing legal 
rules and entitlements, by applying a deferential understanding of 
children’s best interests. The doctrine can accommodate the notion 
that parents will generally act in their children’s best interests and the 
state should intervene only when there is serious reason to doubt that 
this is the case. Parents would thus still be granted a realm of 
discretion to make most medical and nonmedical decisions for 
younger minors, whereas older minors would be granted greater 
power under the “autonomy” prong of the bodily integrity right. In 
other words, the best-interests requirement would be applied 
deferentially, such that judges could not second-guess reasonable 
decisions of fit parents. 
Moreover, given that parents still hold the purse strings in most 
families, they would maintain a significant degree of de facto control 
over many decisions about nonmedically indicated interventions. 
Constitutional law neither can nor should alter this aspect of the 
status quo. The expense and other difficulties of minors’ bringing suit 
therefore likely means that they would be unlikely to do so except in 
the most serious cases. Minors would continue to have access to 
courts to vindicate their own interests in the most limited of 
circumstances, where a guardian ad litem or other entity (such as a 
hospital seeking to provide medical care) is in a position to assert the 
minor’s interests. 
Finally, despite the elision of parental and governmental roles, it 
would require too radical a revision of constitutional law to designate 
every person who acts pursuant to a state grant of authority—such as 
a parent—a state actor for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.296 The need 
to identify a state actor according to conventional legal standards 
would thus remain in § 1983 lawsuits to vindicate minors’ 
constitutional right to bodily integrity. Long-standing jurisprudence 
indicates that even if state action is present (here, based on the 
 
 296. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); see Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 935 n.18 (1982) 
(distinguishing between the requirements of state action under § 1983 and of an action 
performed by a defendant acting “under color of state law”). 
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underlying common-law entitlements giving parents authority over 
their children’s decisions), a private individual cannot be sued unless 
he can be said to be acting under color of state law.297 If a mature 
minor wishes to vindicate her constitutional right to make her own 
medical decisions, for example, she could not bring suit under § 1983 
unless she could identify a state actor who played a role in preventing 
her from doing so. In Joshua DeShaney’s case, the social workers’ 
decision to return him to the home would be sufficient, because they 
are state actors and state action would be identified in the social 
workers’ decision to leave him in the custody of his abusive father.298 
In most cases, however, parents would be considered private actors 
and therefore § 1983 would not apply. 
This limitation on independent lawsuits to vindicate minors’ 
constitutional bodily integrity right would significantly reduce the 
amount of judicial intervention that would result from reformulating 
state-action doctrine to recognize the pervasiveness of state power. 
But at the same time, the domain of parental discretion would begin 
to have meaningful substantive limits, grounded in minors’ 
constitutional right. Though not radically changing the current 
substantive entitlements, the constitutionalization of this domain 
would not be entirely empty. It would have several significant effects 
for minors seeking to vindicate a right to bodily integrity. 
First and foremost, the mature-minor and best-interest doctrines, 
derived from the common law but constitutionalized in the case of 
minors seeking abortions, would become constitutional standards 
across the board because they track closely the essential meaning of 
the bodily integrity right for minors. Though these standards already 
apply to minors seeking to exercise their right to access abortions, 
they would also apply to minors in other medical contexts, such as 
those facing decisions about end-of-life care. In contrast to the status 
quo, minors could not be denied medical care that was in their best 
interests, and mature minors would have a right to make their own 
medical decisions, even in those states that lack mature-minor rules.299 
Currently, minors’ rights in these situations are notably unclear and 
vary from state to state. Therefore, constitutionalizing the mature-
 
 297. See, e.g., Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150–52 (1970) (noting that “our 
cases make clear” that the plaintiff was required to establish that the defendant was acting 
under the color of law to prevail under her § 1983 claim). 
 298. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 194–95 (1989).  
 299. The standards for maturity and best interests are, of course, somewhat amorphous, but 
an attempt to define and clarify them is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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minor and best-interests standards across the board would help 
regularize the landscape and create greater predictability and 
protection for the minors themselves. 
Second, in contrast to the current doctrine, minors in abusive 
homes would have a constitutional cause of action for the 
government’s failure to protect them under this revised 
understanding of state action. Of course, the ability of a minor to sue 
the government for violation of his right to bodily integrity would be 
subject to limitations, both in terms of a requirement that the 
intrusion be severe enough to rise to a constitutionally cognizable 
level, and in terms of the requirements that must be met for 
municipal liability to attach under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, such as a showing 
of “deliberate indifference” on the part of a policymaker or a 
municipal pattern and practice of constitutional violations.300 But the 
minor would not be deprived of that right by a specious and arbitrary 
state-action requirement. If the minor were able to state a 
constitutional claim by identifying a state actor, such as a social 
worker or a police officer who returned her to an abusive home, that 
individual actor would be liable to the minor in a suit for damages, 
barring the assertion of immunities. Even if the individual state actor 
were immune from damages claims, the minor could seek an 
injunction to prevent her return to the home. 
In addition, if a minor were otherwise able to invoke the 
jurisdiction of the court—through an action for an injunction to 
prevent a battery, for example, or through any other relevant cause of 
action under state law—she would be entitled to have constitutional 
bodily integrity norms applied in her case. If the alleged battery, such 
as corporal punishment or a medically unnecessary surgery, was 
found not to be in the minor’s best interests, it could not be forced 
upon her. 
Because the constitutional norms would have to apply in legal 
disputes between private parties, minors would be entitled to 
consideration of their right to bodily integrity when hospitals seek 
court orders to proceed with medical treatment in the face of parental 
refusals, for example. In medical-treatment disputes, this would 
require a consideration of whether the treatment is in a younger 
 
 300. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407 (1997) (noting that “a showing of 
simple or even heightened negligence” would not suffice); Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 
U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (acknowledging that local government customs are subject to scrutiny 
under § 1983). 
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minor’s best interests, granting due deference to parental judgment. 
Such a requirement may or may not align with the current law applied 
in such disputes, given the variation in state law.301 If the minor is 
older, courts will have to determine whether he is mature and well-
informed enough to make the decision on his own, and if so, there 
will be no warrant for deferring to parents’ wishes. Whether this 
process aligns with current substantive legal standards or not, it would 
be a departure from existing case law in which minors’ constitutional 
bodily integrity right is rarely considered. Moreover, merely invoking 
constitutional law rather than state statutory or common law would 
force courts to try to conform their rulings to one another and would 
thereby create a degree of uniformity. 
When minors seek access to nontherapeutic or nonmedical 
interventions, practical concerns regarding the ability to pay for the 
procedure may well prevent cases from getting to court in the first 
place. But for those minors who are old enough to have access to 
funds, a court would be required to allow tattooing or piercing, for 
example, irrespective of state law, so long as the minor can 
demonstrate her maturity. Though it is hard to imagine a scenario in 
which a minor could identify a source of funds but is not mature 
enough to make her own decisions, courts could also consider certain 
interventions to be in the minors’ best interests. For example, a minor 
who can get vaccinated free of charge may argue it is in her best 
interests to do so, even if her parents object. A physician or hospital 
may be in a position to raise such a claim. Similarly, one who is in a 
position to raise the rights of a newborn may object on his behalf to 
genital normalization surgery. 
Admittedly, the possibility of physicians or others raising the 
rights of minors might put some pressure on the doctrine of third-
party standing, which is relatively limited. Courts might find 
themselves being forced to decide who is close enough to a minor to 
assert that minor’s rights as against the minor’s own parents. Yet at 
the same time, it should be expected that such lawsuits would be 
unusual, because of the cost and practical difficulties involved, as well 
as the deferential standard that would be applied in many cases. 
Instead, the constitutionalization of the children’s bodily integrity 
right, while making a concrete difference for some minors, would 
perhaps primarily serve an expressive function for many other 
minors. It would alert adults, along with state-court judges, to the fact 
 
 301. See supra Part I.B.2 and text accompanying notes 62–70. 
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that minors have constitutional rights that must be considered along 
with the interests of the parents and the state. 
CONCLUSION 
The legal doctrine and system of regulation surrounding 
children’s bodies are profoundly fragmented. Similar questions arise 
about the extent of parental control over children’s bodies in 
numerous contexts—such as corporal punishment, medical 
decisionmaking, and reproductive rights—and courts generally apply 
substantively similar standards in analyzing these questions. Yet, 
children’s constitutional right to bodily integrity has not been 
consistently recognized across those doctrinal areas, and it has been 
only partially constitutionalized. 
This Article argues that the reason for this fragmentation lies in 
the unique difficulty of identifying state action in cases involving 
children’s right to bodily integrity. This difficulty is partly a doctrinal 
one that is attributable to three separate factors. First, state action is 
difficult to identify when private actors, rather than state actors, are 
primarily responsible for the infringement of the minor’s bodily 
integrity—even though the infringement is directly enabled by state 
laws delegating authority over children to parents. Second, and 
relatedly, it is difficult to impute infringements on minors’ bodily 
integrity right to the state when the parents’ actions are taken 
pursuant to facially neutral rules granting broad parental discretion, 
such as those authorizing parents to consent to medical treatment for 
their minor children, rather than rules authorizing specific 
interventions, such as those permitting sterilization of mentally 
incompetent minors or requiring parental consent for an abortion. 
Third, the fundamental, unresolved tension between the liberal and 
parentalist perspectives in the case law means that courts have 
difficulty identifying whether the state has actually intervened in the 
family—that is, whether state intervention consists of empowering 
parents or of empowering children. Moreover, these doctrinal 
difficulties reflect the tendency of state power to permeate every 
aspect of family life through a discourse that relentlessly seeks to 
examine the most private of domains. Ostensibly private settings such 
as the family are “governmentalized” through the application of legal 
and social norms, which threaten to turn the family into yet another 
tentacle of the state. Paradoxically, the recognition of privacy rights 
within the family only magnifies this tendency, as it invites judicial 
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intervention into, and examination of, parents’ and children’s 
decisionmaking processes. 
Recognizing children’s constitutional right to bodily integrity in 
each domain where the state plays a role in delegating authority over 
children’s bodies would clear the way for a more robust and coherent 
doctrine. Indeed, the fundamental substantive principles of children’s 
bodily integrity right have already been established in both 
constitutional and common-law cases—that is, older, mature minors 
are entitled to make decisions autonomously and younger, immature 
minors are entitled to have the state safeguard their best interests. 
In addition, a broader understanding of state action in the 
context of children’s rights is necessary. Because state power already 
determines the scope of parental authority over children, state action 
is present whenever a parent violates a child’s bodily integrity 
pursuant to a delegation of authority from the state. Although 
parents should still be presumed to be acting in their children’s best 
interests, their decisions should not be entirely immune from judicial 
consideration. Minors should be able to challenge the 
constitutionality of those parental decisions if they can overcome the 
practical and procedural hurdles to achieving judicial consideration of 
their constitutional claims. 
Admittedly, this proposed revision of constitutional doctrine still 
relies upon murky concepts—such as maturity and best interests—
that do not always admit of clear, bright-line rules. Moreover, the 
scope of substantive discretion to be afforded to parents under this 
proposed framework requires further judicial specification. However, 
despite leaving some questions unanswered, this Article suggests a 
way in which the children’s constitutional bodily integrity right may 
be recognized and respected within the family without 
constitutionalizing every aspect of family life. 
 
